Sunday, March 31, 2013

「穂国」の伝統芸能「笹踊り」の写真がとどく。

 わたしの若い友人柴田晴廣さん(牛久保町在住)から,今日(31日),行われたばかりの祭りの写真が「どさっ」ととどきました。その祭りというのが,わたしの子どものころ住んでいた大村町の懐かしい祭りです。そこでは珍しい「笹踊り」という郷土芸能が伝承されています。この地域,つまり,東三河ではあちこちの村祭りの名物のひとつになっていて,それぞれの地域によって少しずつ踊り方が違う「笹踊り」が伝承されています。柴田さんは,じつは,この「笹踊り」の研究者の第一人者でもあります。ですから,祭りがはじまると忙しく,あちこちの祭りのフィールド・ワークにでかけます。わたしが大村町の出身であることを知っている柴田さんは,わざわざ,雨の中,出かけていって写真を撮って送ってくださった,という次第です。


 もう少しだけ,柴田さんのことを紹介しておきたいと思います。柴田さんには『穂国幻史考』(常左府文庫,2007年)という大著があります。「穂国」(「ほこく」とふりがながしてありますが,わたしは「ほのくに」と読みたい)とは,いにしえの東三河地方の地名です。日本が律令国家としての体裁をととのえるころの古代史に注目し,たとえば,持統天皇がわざわざ「穂国」に行幸したのはなぜか,と問いかけ中央の大和(瑞穂の国)の歴史(たとえば『古事記』や『日本書紀』)に封じ籠められた「謎」を解きほぐし,古代史の「定説」に一矢報いようという,きわめて意欲的な著書を書いていらっしゃいます。いま,話題になっている古代史読解の魁的なお仕事をされた方として,わたしは注目しています。その関連で,「笹踊り」も重要な研究対象とされていらっしゃる,というわけです。こちらは,朝鮮通信使との関連で,瞠目すべき考察を展開されています。


 この柴田さんの『穂国幻史考』に触発されて,ちょっと待て,わたしの育った「大村町」というところもよくよく考えてみると,とんでもないところだったのではないか,といまごろになって気づきはじめています。いまの段階では,あまり詳しいことはまだ書けませんが,いずれ明らかにしてみたいと思っています。そのひとつの手がかりが「八所神社」のお祭りです。大村町には,現在,五つの集落があります。それらの集落にはそれぞれ一つずつ村社があります。それらとは別に,それらの集落を全部合わせた共同の神社として「八所神社」があります。ということは,あと三つの集落がむかしはあったのではないか,それがいつのまにか消えて五つになっている,という不思議な謎があります。

もう一つは,この大村町という地域の広がりが,いまの行政区画で確認してみても,おどろくほど広いのです。しかも,むかしは(と言ってもわたしの子どものころ)大雨が降って豊川が氾濫すると,大村町の半分の集落は大水に浸され孤立してしまいます。もちろん,学校も休みでした。そのむかしは,豊川が氾濫するたびに,その流れを変えて,この大村町の区画も川になったようです。その痕跡があちこちに,いまも,残っています。そのため,豊川の氾濫する水を塞き止めるために二重の堤防が,この地域にはあります。わたしの育った寺は,その二重の堤防の外側にありました。そのことの意味が,いまごろになって,ああ,そういうことだったのか,と想像できるようになってきました。


 水の問題は,どうやら,この大村町にあっては大昔から大問題でした。ですから,この水の対策にこの地に住む人びとは頭を悩ましつづけたに違いありません。それでも,この地を捨てるわけにはいかない人びとが,ずっとこの地を守ってきました。その水問題との関連で,八つの集落が力を合わせて,大きな事業をなし遂げる必要があったのでしょう。それが堤防と用水でした。つまり,豊川が氾濫するときの水の逃げ道として,この大村町は位置づけられていたということです。そこに至りつくまでには,相当の紆余曲折があったに違いありません。その全集落を挙げての協力・結束の記念すべきシンボルとして「八所神社」がある,とわたしは考えています。

 その「八所神社」に「笹踊り」が伝承されているというのも,偶然ではない,とわたしは考えています。朝鮮通信使が東海道を練り歩く姿を,「穂国」の人びとは熱烈歓迎したことでしょう。そういう心性を共有した人びとが多く住んでいたのでしょう。もっと言ってしまえば,持統天皇が行幸に来なくてはならない,なんらかの理由のある人びとが,この「穂国」には多く住んでいたということでしょう。その謎を解く鍵のひとつは,三河国一宮である「砥鹿神社」(祭神は大巳貴命)にあります。ここからさきの話は,柴田さんの独壇場です。『穂国幻史考』を参照してください。


 
 わたしも,大きくなったら,青年団に入って,この「笹踊り」を踊るのが夢でした。が,その夢を果たせないまま上京し,そのままこちらに居つくことになってしまいました。まだ,将来のことなどなにも考えない子どものころ,毎年,羨望の眼で眺めていた懐かしい「笹踊り」の写真を眺めながら,思いは一気に60年前に・・・・・。


 来年はなんとか時間を工面して,この祭りに出かけてみよう・・・・とそんな気になってきました。そのときは,ぜひ,柴田さんと一緒に・・・・と勝手に決め込んでいます。柴田さん,よろしくお願いします。

 というところで,ひとまず,ここまで。

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Arco Iris parcial

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Iridiscencias

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Nubes Lenticulares

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31/3/2013: Bank Leverage, Systemic Crises and Debt v Equity Funding: Tax Asymmetry



As the readers of this blog would know, I have been advocating more symmetric tax treatment of equity and debt, both in terms of public and private bonds and lending taxation. Here's a recent IMF paper on the topic that provides evidence that asymmetric taxation of debt and equity, with preferential treatment of debt over equity, generated internal instability in the system, making it more prone to crises.

Mooij, Ruud A., Keen, Michael and Orihara, Masanori paper "Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises" (February 2013). IMF Working Paper No. 13/48 argues that "that most corporate tax systems favor debt over equity finance is now widely recognized as, potentially, amplifying risks to financial stability. This paper makes a first attempt to explore, empirically, the link between this tax bias and the probability of financial crisis."

The study "…finds that greater tax bias is associated with significantly higher aggregate bank leverage, and that this in turn is associated with a significantly greater chance of crisis. The implication is that tax bias makes crises much more likely, and, conversely, that the welfare gains from policies to alleviate it can be substantial far greater than previous studies, which have ignored financial stability considerations, suggest."

The paper "aims to provide a first attempt to establish and quantify an empirical link between the tax incentives that encourage financial institutions (more precisely, banks, the group for which we have data) to finance themselves by debt rather than equity and the likelihood of financial crises erupting; and then to try to quantify the welfare gains that policies to address this bias might consequently yield."

The paper combines two elements in a causal chain:

"The first is that between the statutory corporate tax rate and banks’ leverage. This has received substantial attention in relation to non-financial firms, but very little in relation to the financial sector. Keen and De Mooij (2011), however, show that for banks too a higher corporate tax rate, amplifying the tax advantage of debt over equity finance, should in principle lead to higher levels of leverage; the presence of capital regulations does not affect the usual tax bias applying, so long as it is privately optimal for banks to hold some buffer over regulatory requirements (as they generally do).

[In other words, capital requirements regulations are not sufficient to address the problem created by skewed incentives. The authors state that "Regulation, of course, has historically had the dominant role in addressing such problems of excess leverage in the financial sector, and the higher and tighter capital requirements of Basel III should to some degree reduce the welfare costs of debt bias."]

Empirically too, Keen and de Mooij (2012) find that, for a large cross-country panel of banks, tax effects on leverage are significant—and, on average, about as large as for non-financial institutions. These effects are very much smaller, they also find, for the largest banks, which generally account for the vast bulk of all bank assets. …Importantly, the finding that tax distortions to leverage are small for the larger banks, which are massively larger than the rest, does not mean that the welfare impact of tax distortions is in aggregate negligible: even small changes in the leverage of very large banks could have a large impact on the likelihood of their distress or failure, and hence on the likelihood of financial crisis."

The second link in the causal chain is the link "between the aggregate leverage of the financial sector and the probability of financial crisis. We estimate such a relationship for OECD countries, …capturing data on the recent financial crisis… The results suggest sizeable and highly nonlinear effects of aggregate bank leverage on the probability of financial crisis."

"… we consider three tax reforms that would reduce the tax incentive to debt finance:

  • a cut in the corporate tax rate; 
  • adoption of an Allowance for Corporate Equity form of corporate tax (which would in principle eliminate debt bias); and 
  • a ‘bank levy’ of broadly the kind that a dozen or so countries have introduced since the crisis."

"The implications of these reforms for aggregate leverage are readily estimated using the results above.

  1. We suppose, as before, that a 1 percentage point reduction in the CIT rate reduces banks’ aggregate leverage by somewhere between 0.04 and 0.15. 
  2. This means, for instance, that the bank levy of 10 bp would reduce financial leverage by between 0.1 and 0.4 percentage points, for example from 93 percent to 92.9 or 92.6. 
  3. Eliminating debt bias altogether with an ACE would reduce leverage by 2.2 percentage points under what we shall take to be the central estimate of 0.08: say, from 93 to 90.8; with the upper bound estimate of 0.15, leverage would fall by 4.2 percentage points."

The above clearly suggests that ACE approach, basically removing disincentive to equity funding compared to other policy alternatives. It also shows that in impact terms, lower corporate tax rates are not sufficient to eliminate or reduce the adverse effects of the asymmetric treatment of debt against equity.
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Happy Easter

The real meaning of Easter has had to fight the nonsensical infiltration into the true meaning of Easter.



So here's the comeuppance for the bunny ....


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31/3/2013: German Hartz IV reforms - evidence


Another interesting paper, worth a read: Krebs, Tom and Scheffel, Martin, "Macroeconomic Evaluation of Labor Market Reform in Germany" (February 2013). IMF Working Paper No. 13/42.

Back in 2005 Germany undertook a massive reform of social welfare systems, known as Hartz IV reform. This "amounted to a complete overhaul of the German unemployment insurance system and resulted in a significant reduction in unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed".

The IMF paper used "an incomplete-market model with search unemployment to evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of the Hartz IV reform". The model was calibrated to German data before the reform followed by simulation of the calibrated model to identify the effects of Hartz IV.

"In our baseline calibration, we find that the reform has reduced the long-run (non-cyclical) unemployment rate in Germany by 1.4 percentage points. We also find that the welfare of employed households increases, but the welfare of unemployed households decreases even with moderate degree of risk aversion."

For all the debate about the merits of such reforms, it is pretty darn clear that Hartz IV-styled reforms - currently being advocated by the IMF and the EU for the peripheral states - cannot take place in the environment of protracted and structural Euro area-wide and national recessions and especially in the presence of other exacerbating factors, such as debt overhangs,  insolvency regime breaks, dysfunctional banking sector, monetary policy mismatch, etc.

Put simply, in 2005, German economy was into its second year of (anaemic at 0.7% in 2004 and 0.84% in 2005) growth with unemployment at an uncomfortable 11.2% still leagues below the current rates in the peripheral state. German government deficit in 2005 was at relatively benign 3.42% compared to the deficits in the peripheral states, with structural deficit at even lighter load of -2.6% of p-GDP and primary deficit at 1.0%. German debt/GDP ratio on Government side was at 68.5% of GDP. All of these parameters clearly indicate that Germany was in a much better starting position for consolidating social insurance systems than the peripheral states find themselves today.
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