22/8/2013: Slow Moving Sovereign Debt Crises: a new MIT Paper

Guido Lorenzoni and Ivan Werning (LW, 2013) new paper "Slow Moving Debt Crises" (June 30, 2013, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper 13-18. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298813) theoretically links the environment and policies conditions that can lead to self-fulfilling increases in sovereign interest rates.

To do so, the authors use a model of the dynamics of debt and interest rates in a setting where default is driven by insolvency. "Fiscal deficits and surpluses are subject to shocks but influenced by a fiscal policy rule. Whenever possible the government issues debt to meet its current obligations and defaults otherwise."

The result is a model that has multiple equilibria where both "low and high interest rate equilibria may coexist". There are self-fulfilling risks as "higher interest rates, prompted by fears of default, lead to faster debt accumulation, validating default fears. We call such an equilibrium a slow moving crisis, in contrast to rollover crises where investor runs precipitate immediate default." In a sense, Italy, and potentially the rest of the euro area periphery, ex-Ireland, appear to be stuck in this 'slow moving debt crisis'.

In September 2012, commenting on the ECB announcement of OMT, the ECB’s president,
Mario Draghi, clearly linked the on-going sovereign debt crisis in euro area peripheral states to a self-fulfilling crisis: “…we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the Euro Area in what we call a bad equilibrium, namely an equilibrium where you have self-fulfilling expectations. You may have self-fulfilling expectations that generate, that feed upon themselves, and generate adverse, very adverse scenarios. So there is a case for intervening to, in a sense, break these expectations [...]”

According to LW (2013): "If this view is correct, a credible announcement is all it takes to rule out bad equilibria, no bond purchases need to be carried out. To date, this is exactly how it seems to have played out."

In the LW (2013) model, "the government faces a fluctuating path of fiscal surpluses or deficits, that are affected by shocks and the current debt level. Each period, it attempts to meet these obligations by visiting a credit market, issuing bonds to a large group of risk-neutral investors. The capacity to borrow is limited endogenously by the prospect of future repayment and default occurs when a government’s need for funds exceeds this borrowing capacity. In equilibrium, bond prices incorporate the probability of default."

Bonds can be issued as short-term and long-term. "In the case of short-term debt", LW (2013) show that "the equilibrium bond price function (mapping the state
of the economy into bond prices) is uniquely determined."

The main point, however, is that uniqueness of he price function "does not imply that the equilibrium is unique. Multiplicity arises from what we call a Laffer curve effect: revenue from a bond auction is non-monotone in the amount of bonds issued. If the borrower targets a given level of revenue, then there are multiple bond prices consistent with an equilibrium."

"With long-term bonds the price function is no longer uniquely determined, because a
bad equilibrium with lower bond prices in the future now feeds back into current bond
prices. In addition, the existence of a good and bad equilibrium may be temporary. For
example, if we follow the bad equilibrium path for a sufficiently long period of time,
the debt level may reach a level for which there exists a unique continuation equilibrium with high interest rates; the bad equilibrium may set in."

This is important to the current case, as it links directly high level debt starting position to the bad equilibrium outcome without the need to reference investors' withdrawal from the funding market. This is the core difference to the traditional crises and LW (2013) call this a 'slow moving debt crisis' "to capture the fact
that it develops over time through the accumulation of debt" as distinguished "from liquidity or rollover debt crises". The 'liquidity crisis' occurs when "current investors, …pull out of the market entirely, leading to a failed bond auction; complete lack of credit then triggers default, analogous to depositors running on banks".

LW (2013) model "can be used to identify a “safe” region of parameters, for which
the equilibrium is unique. In particular, the safe region corresponds to a low initial debt level and to high responsiveness of the surplus to debt in the fiscal policy rule."

Very interesting conclusion from the LW (2013) paper is that "with long term debt, a slow moving crisis, by its very nature is due to a breakdown in the coordination of investors at different dates. As a result, it cannot be averted by coordinating investors meeting in a given market at a certain moment of time. If, instead, the borrower could commit to a certain bond issuance, this would eliminate the multiplicity problem." The commitment that ends such a crisis, in theory, implies commitment to specific steady levels of borrowing - a deficit path - while maintaining certain debt bounds forward. In contrast to mainstream literature, LW (2013) "assume that the borrower cannot commit to a certain bond issuance, because it cannot adjust its spending needs. Thus, it will issue the bonds needed to finance its obligations." The reason for this assumption is that while the borrowers "can control the amount of bonds issued… during any given market transaction or offer", in the long run, the actual amounts raised in the markets will not be fully predictable. Per LW (2013): "consider a borrower showing up to market with some given amount of bonds to sell. If the price turns out to be lower than expected the borrower may quickly return to offer additional bonds for sale to make up the difference in funding [and thus] …the overall size of the bond issuance remains endogenous to the bond price."

LW (2013) conclude that "it seems difficult to dismiss the concern that a country may find itself in a self-fulfilling “bad equilibrium” with high interest rates. In our model, bad equilibria are not driven by the fear of a sudden rollover crisis, as commonly modeled in the literature following Giavazzi and Pagano (1989), Alesina et al. (1992) and Cole and Kehoe (1996) and others. Thus, the problems these “bad equilibria” present are not resolved by attempts to rule out such investor runs. Instead, high interest rates can be self fulfilling because they imply a slow but perverse debt dynamic. Our results highlight the importance of fiscal policy rules and debt maturity in determining whether the economy is safe from the threat of these slow moving crises."

Any source

22/7/2013: That Growing Debt Pile...

In the week when Irish debt/GDP pushes above 125% that some of the luminary 'green jerseyists' said it will never do, let's say loudly to ourselves: "Ireland is not Greece..."

A gentle reminder to stay calm and not to worry, because, as we now know, debt does not matter at all... what matters is pants,.. bright pink pants...

Chart source: http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2013e1.pdf

Any source

8/7/2013: IMF on Euro Area: Repetition in the Endless Unlearning of Reality

IMF released its statement on 2013 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area

The Statement reads (emphasis mine):
"Policy actions over the past year have addressed important tail risks and stabilized financial markets. But growth remains weak and unemployment is at a record high."

So what needs to be done, you might ask? Oh, nothing new, really. Euro area needs:
-- To take "concerted policy actions to restore financial sector health and complete the banking union". Wait… err… this was not planned to-date? Really?
-- "continued demand support in the near term and deeper structural reforms throughout the euro area remain instrumental to raise growth and create jobs". In other words: find some dish to spend on stuff and hope this will do the trick on short-term growth. Reform thereafter.

Not exactly encouraging? How about this: "…the centrifugal forces across the euro area remain serious and are pulling down growth everywhere. Financial markets are still fragmented along national borders and the cost of borrowing for the private sector is high in the periphery, particularly for smaller enterprises. Ailing banks continue to hold back the flow of credit." So the solution is - more credit? Now, what did we call credit in old days? Right… debt, so: "In the face of high private debt and continued uncertainty, households and firms are postponing spending—previously, this was mainly a problem of the periphery but uncertainty over the adequacy and timing of the policy response is now making itself felt in falling demand in the core as well." Wait a second, now: more credit… err… debt will solve the problem, but the problem is too much debt… err… credit from the past…

Ok, from IMF own publication earlier this year, what happens when credit - debt - is let loose:

Source: http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/03/05/a-missing-piece-in-europes-growth-puzzle/


Just in case you need more of this absurdity: "…reviving growth and employment is imperative. This requires actions on multiple fronts—repairing banks’ balance sheets, making further progress on banking union, supporting demand, and advancing structural reforms. These actions would be mutually reinforcing: measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors, which in turn would help restore competitiveness and raise growth in these economies. A piecemeal approach, on the other hand, could further undermine confidence and leave the euro area vulnerable to renewed stress." Oh, well, 5 years ago we needed

1. 'actions on repairing banks balance sheets' - five years later, we still need them;
2. actions on 'supporting demand' - aka, no tax increases and some investment stimulus - five years on, we still need them;
3. actions on 'advancing structural reforms' and five years on, we still need them too;
4. "measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors" - wait a second ten years ago we had easy credit conditions in the periphery and they failed comprehensively to 'boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors', having gone instead to fuel property and public spending bubbles… five years since the start of the crisis, we now should expect a sudden change in the economies response to easier credit supply?

IMF is more sound on banks: "bank losses need to be fully recognized, frail but viable banks recapitalized, and non-viable banks closed or restructured". But, five years, bank losses needed to be fully recognised too and we are still waiting. And when it comes to closing or restructuring non-viable banks, pardon me, but where was the IMF in the case of Ireland when the country was forced by the ECB to underwrite non-viable banks with taxpayers funds?

"A credible assessment of bank balance sheets is necessary to lift confidence in the euro area financial system." Ok, we had three assessments of euro area banks - none credible and all highly questionable in outcomes. Five years in, we are still waiting for an honest, open, transparent assessment.

Cutting past the complete waffle on the banking union and ESM, "The ECB could build on existing instruments—such as a new LTRO of longer tenor coupled with a review of current collateral policies, particularly on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—or undertake a targeted LTRO specifically linked to new SME lending." Ooops, I have been saying for years now that the ECB should create a long-term funding pool for most distressed banks, stretching 10-15 years. Five years into the crisis - still waiting.


On structural reforms, IMF is going now broader and further than before and I like their migration:

"For the euro area, …a targeted implementation of the Services Directive would remove barriers to protected professions, promote cross-border competition, and, ultimately, raise productivity and incomes. A new round of free trade agreements could provide a much-needed push to improve services productivity. In addition, further support for credit and investment could be achieved through EIB facilities. The securitization schemes proposed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank could also underpin SME lending and capital market development." Do note that the last two proposals are still about debt generation (see above).

"At the national level, labor market rigidities [same-old] should be tackled to raise participation, address duality—which disproportionally hurts younger workers—and, where necessary, promote more flexible bargaining arrangements. At the same time, lowering regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms and tackling vested interests in the product markets throughout the euro area would support competitiveness, as it would deliver a shift of resources to export sectors [ok, awkwardly put, but pretty much on the money. Except, greatest protectionism in the EU is accorded to banks and famers, and these require first and foremost restructuring]."

In short - little new imagination, loads of old statements replays and little irony in recognising that much of this has been said before… five years before, four years before, three years before, two years before, a year before… you get my point.

Any source