11/10/2013: What's 'new' in German Coalition talks... what's Ireland...

So today's report in the Irish Times on German Government coalition talks and demands by the Social Democrats (SPD) on Germany blocking use of ESM to cover Irish Exchequer debt exposures arising from the banking crisis and for Germany to adopt a tougher stance on irish corporate tax regime are news... Read them here: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/irish-debt-linked-to-angela-merkel-talks-on-coalition-1.1556845

Now, recall this: http://www.fergco.co/2013/10/8102013-german-voters-go-for-status-quo.html where all of this fall-out from the German elections was foretold...

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10/10/2013: IMF's GFSR October 2013: Focus on Corporate Debt Overhang

I'll be blogging out today some interesting charts from the IMF's GFSR October 2013... these will appear in no particular order, with brief summaries...

Here's a start: non-financial corporate sector debt crises in the euro periphery. I always noted that the important issue in the current crisis is not just a traditional sovereign debt crunch, but the debt overhang over what I call the total real economic debt: household, non-financial corporate and government debts.

In the above that Irish banks offer lower rates, based on the bank capital and reserves ratio to NPLs than other banks, including Portugal, Italy and Spain. Also note that 5 years into the crisis and after massive recapitalisations Irish banks buffers are lower than for any other economy, save Cyprus and Greece. That is the cost of delaying resolution of the loans.

Note: my latest article on European and Irish banking systems is available here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/10/9102013-leveraged-and-sick-euro-area.html

The next four charts show that quality of loans to non-financial corporate sector is deteriorating and remaining poor for firms in the periphery, while improving for German and French firms.

Most worrying is the Italian situation where quality of loans is continuing to deteriorate and the rate of deterioration is accelerating, while Spanish situation remains exceptionally weak:

Things are desperate-to-dire in Greece and Portugal too:

More to come, so stay tuned...

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9/10/2013: Leveraged and Sick: Euro Area Banks - Sunday Times October 6

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from October 6, 2013.


Newton’s Third Law of Motion postulates that to every action, there is always an equal and opposite reaction. Alas, as recent economic history suggests, physics laws do not apply to economics.

The events of September are case in point. In recent weeks, economic data from the euro area and Ireland have been signaling some improvement in growth conditions. Physics would suggest that the reaction should be to use this time to put forward new systems that can help us averting or mitigating the next crises and deal with the current one. Political economy, in contrast, tells us that any improvement is just a signal to policymakers to slip back into the comfort of status quo.

Meanwhile, the core problems of the Financial Crisis and the Great Recession remain unaddressed, and risks in the global financial markets, are rising, not falling.

More ominously, the Euro area, and by corollary Ireland, are now once again in the line of fire. The reason for this is that for all the talk about drastic changes in the way the financial services operate and are regulated, Europe has done virtually nothing to effectively address the lessons learned since September 2008.


Last month we marked the fifth anniversaries of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the introduction of the Irish banking guarantee. These events define the breaking points of the global financial crisis. In the same month we also saw the restart of the Greek debt negotiations ahead of the Third Bailout, the Portuguese Government announcement that its debt will reach 128 percent of the country GDP by the end of this year, a renewed political crisis in Italy, and continued catastrophic decline in the Cypriot economy. Public debt levels across the entire euro periphery are still rising; economies continue to shrink or stagnate. Financial system remains dysfunctional and loaded with risks. Voters are growing weary of this mess. In Spain, political divisions and separatist movements gained strength, while German and Austrian elections have signaled a prospect of the governments’ paralysis.

In Ireland, the poster boy for EU policies, pressures continued to build up in the banking system. The Central Bank is barely containing its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress achieved by the banks in dealing with arrears and is forcefully pushing through new, ever more ambitious, mortgages resolutions targets. Yet it is not empowered to enforce these targets and has no capacity to steer the banks in the direction of safeguarding consumer interests. Business loans continue to meltdown hidden in the accounts.

Meanwhile, the latest set of data from the banking sector is highlighting the fact that little has changed on the ground in five years of the crisis. Domestic deposits are flat or declining – depending on which part of the system one looks at. Foreign deposits are falling. Credit supply continues to shrink.


Perhaps the greatest problem faced by the euro area and Ireland is that since the late 2008, tens of thousands of pages of new regulations have been drawn up in attempting to cover up the collapse of the banking system. Well in excess of EUR 700 billion was spent on ‘repairing’ the banks. And yet, few tangible changes on the ground have taken place. The lessons of the crisis have not been learned and its legacy continues to persist.

There are three basic problems with euro area financial systems as they stand today - the very same problems that plagued the system since the start of the crisis. These are: high leverage and systemic risks, excessive concentration of the banks by size, and wrong-headed regulatory responses to the crisis.

European banks are still leveraged far above safety levels. Lehman Brothers borrowed 31 times its own capital in mid-2008. Today, euro area banks borrow even more. No new European rules on leverage have been written, let alone implemented.

New York University’s Volatility Lab maintains a current database on systemic risks present in the global banking sector. Top 50, ranked by the degree of leverage carried on their balance sheet, euro area banks had combined exposure to USD 1.376 trillion in systemic risks at the end of last week. The banks market value was half of that at USD668 billion. Average leverage in the euro area top 50 banks is 58.5 or almost double Lehman's, when measured as a function of own equity. Two flagship Irish banks, still rated internationally, Bank of Ireland and Ptsb, are ranked 37th and 46th in terms of overall leverage risks and carry combined systemic risk of USD11.4 billion. Accounting for the banks provisions for bad loans, the two would rank in top 20 most risky banks in the advanced world.

Compare this to the US banking system. The highest level of leverage recorded for any American bank is 20.4 times (to equity). Total systemic risk of the top 50 leveraged financial institutions in the entire Americas (North and South) is around USD489 billion, set against the market value of these institutions of USD1.4 trillion.

Since September 2008, systemic risk in the US banking system has more than halved. In the case of euro area, the decline is only one-fifth.

Euro area banks positions as too-big-to-fail are becoming even stronger as the result of the crisis. In the peripheral euro states, and especially in Ireland, this effect is magnified by the deliberate policies attempting to shore up their banking systems by further concentrating market power of ‘Pillar’ banks.


Another area in which change has been scarce is the regulations concerning the funding of the banks. The crisis was driven, in part, by the short-term nature of banks funding – the main cause for the issuance of the September 2008 banking guarantee in Ireland.

In the wake of the crisis, one would naturally expect the new regulatory changes to focus on increasing the deposits share in funding and on reducing banks’ reliance on and costly (in the case of restructuring) senior bonds. None of this has happened to-date and following Cypriot haircuts on depositors one can argue that the ability of euro area banks to raise funding via deposits has now been reduced, not increased.

In addition to driving consolidation of the sector, Europe’s political leaders promised to raise the capital requirements on the banks. Actions did not match their rhetoric. Higher capital holdings are not being put in place fast enough. The EU is actively attempting to delay global efforts at introduction of new minimum standards for capital. As the result, current levels of capital buffers held by the top 50 euro area banks are below those held by Lehman Brothers at the end of 2008. Irish banks capital levels, even after massive injections of 2011, are also lower than that of Lehman’s once the expected losses are accounted for.


Even more ominously, the ideology of harmonisation as a solution to every problem still dominates the EU thinking. This ideology directly contradicts core principles of risk management. By reducing diversity of the regulatory and supervisory systems, the EU is making a bet that its approach to regulation is the best that can ever be developed. History of the entire European Monetary Union existence tells us that this is unlikely to be the case.

Moving from diverse regulatory systems and competitive banking toward harmonised regulation and more concentrated financial sector dominated by the too-big-to-fail ‘Pillar’ institutions implies the need for ever-rising levels of rescue funds and capital buffers.

Currently, there are only two proposals as to how this demand for rescue funds can be addressed. You guessed it – both are utterly unrealistic when it comes to political economy’s reality.

The first one is promising to deliver a small rescue fund for future banks rescues capitalized out of a special banks levy. The fund is not going to be operative for at least ten years from its formation and will not be able to deal with the current crisis legacy debts.

The second plan was summarized this week in the IMF policy paper. Per IMF, full fiscal harmonisation is a necessary condition for existence of the common currency. A full fiscal union, and by corollary a political union as well, is required to absorb potential shocks from the future crises. The union should cover better oversight by the EU authorities over national budgets and fiscal policies, a centralised budget, borrowing and taxing authority, and a credible and independent fund for backstopping shocks to the banking sector. In more simple terms, the IMF is outlining a federal government for Europe, minus democratic controls and elections.

Under all of these plans, there is no promise of relief for Ireland on crisis-related banking debts. In fact, the IMF proposals clearly and explicitly state that the stand-alone fund will only be available to deal with future crises. Addressing legacy costs will require separate mutualisation of the Government liabilities relating to the banking sector rescues. The IMF proposal, in the case of Ireland, means accepting tax harmonisation and surrendering some of the Irish tax revenues to the federal authorities.


At this stage, it is painfully clear to any objective observer that fundamental drivers of the Financial Crisis triggered by the events of September 2008 remain unaddressed in the case of European banking. Thus, core risks contained in the financial system in Europe and in Ireland in particular are now rising once again. Politics have been trumping logic over the last five years just as they did in the years building up to the crisis. This is not a good prescription for the future.

Box-Out: 

A study by the Bank for International Settlements researchers, Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi, published this week, attempted to uncover the reasons for the negative relationship between the rate of growth in financial services and the rate of growth in innovation-related productivity. In other words, the study looked at what is known in economics as total factor productivity growth – growth in productivity attributable to skills, technology, as well as other 'softer' sources, such as, for example, entrepreneurship or changes in corporate strategies, etc. The authors found that an increase in financial sector activity leads to outflow of skilled workers away from entrepreneurial ventures and toward financial sector. This, in turn, results in the financial sector growth crowding out growth in R&D-intensive firms and industries. The study used data for 15 OECD countries, including some countries with open economies and significant shares of financial sector in GDP, similar to Ireland. The findings are striking: R&D intensive sectors located in a country whose financial system is growing rapidly grow between 1.9 and 2.9% a year slower low R&D intensity sectors located in a country whose financial system is growing slowly. This huge effect implies that for the economies like Ireland, shifting economic development to R&D-intensive activity will require significant efforts to mitigate the effects of the IFSC on draining the indigenous skills pool. It also implies that Ireland should consider running an entirely separate system for attracting skilled immigrants for specific sectors.

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4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Banks & Exchequer

IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding. I covered growth-related issues arising from the IMF release here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/10/4102013-imf-11th-review-of-ireland.html

Now, some other topics, namely banks and the Exchequer.

Per IMF: "Ireland is expected to return to reliance on market financing in 2014, yet further European support could make Ireland’s recovery and debt sustainability more robust. Irish banks face weak profitability that hinders their capacity to revive lending. European support to lower banks’ market funding costs could help sustain domestic demand recovery in the medium term, protecting debt sustainability and financial market confidence."

What's that about? Here are two charts:

IMF: "The recent retracement of Irish sovereign bond yields has been broadly consistent with the experience of other countries in the euro area periphery." [But wait, what about Ireland's unparalleled success in fiscal adjustments and 'best-in-class' status? Are the IMF saying that Enda did not singlehandedly deliver huge improvements in Irish bonds yields? How can this be the case, unless the Irish Government uses 'we' as denoting 'Peripheral Countries' collective in claims that the Govenment has delivered stabilisation of Government funding costs.]

"After touching record lows in early May, the 10 year yield has risen 56 basis points, to 3.98 percent as of September 11. Market tensions dissipated in July after the settlement of the political crisis in Portugal and recent turbulence in emerging markets has had limited effect on Irish bond yields. No new bond has been issued by the Irish sovereign since the €5 billion ten-year issue in mid March." The latter, of course simply means that lower supply of new bonds (lack of it since mid-March) and now the new announcement by NTMA that it will not be tapping the markets any time before official exit from Troika supports, are keeping things steady in yields terms. Otherwise… well… logic suggests, at least speculatively, they can be higher.

And on banks: "From a trough in mid-May, yields on Bank of Ireland (BoI) and Allied Irish Banks (AIB) 3 year covered bonds have edged up some 40 basis points as of September 11. Since its May 30 issuance, the yield on BoI’s 3 year senior unsecured bond has been more volatile, but overall has risen by 62 basis points, to 3.37 percent."

Bah! Two things to say about the above:

1. Banks bonds still tracing sovereign risks and that holds even for covered bonds! Not a good sign for the banking sector. The explicit guarantee is gone, so now it is don to the implicit guarantee and the state simply cannot shake off the baggage of the original 2008 Guarantee. Irish banks are still too-big-to-fail and Irish state is still a too-small-to-bail-in banks lenders.
2. For an army of bonds sales-desks analysts out there pontification on Irish economy, I am yet to see their honest analysis on what is happening with banks funding costs and sovereign funding costs. They are a bit too keen talking about the economy and too little about debt markets. Which is sort of 'your dentist is football analyst' analogy...

"Deposit rates continued to inch downward, however, and ECB borrowing by domestic banks fell from €39.6 billion at end March to €33.4 billion at end August, reflecting a paucity of new lending, further noncore asset deleveraging, modest amounts of new market funding, and a broadly stable deposit base."

So cheap funding dissipating, deposits (stable funding) still anaemic or declining… Happy times, folks. Stabilisation bites. Come back and argue that when businesses and households are croaking under the weight of interest on their debts with the above 'improvements'.

Why wait, however, let's take a look at IMF-reported 2009-2013 data:
Banks non-performing loans (vs provisions) as % of total loans: 2009=9% (4%) or 44.4% cover, 2012 = 11.3% (5.4%) or 47.8% cover, 2013 = 11.5% (4.5%) or 39.1% cover. So cover is shrinking! Meanwhile, personal lending rates have gone up (as ECB repo rate went down) from 11.1% in 2009 to 11.6% in 2013, and SVR mortgages rates have gone up from 3.3% in 2009 to 4.4% in 2013. Government bond yields are down from 4.9% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2013. What's happening folks" The state credit costs are being dumped onto mortgagees. The 'rescue' of the banks and subsequently the rescue of the state has been loaded up onto the borrowers from the banks.


On the positive side, Exchequer performance was good. Not spectacular, but fine - in line with (and slightly better than) budgetary targets:

Do note the caveats listed below the charts - it would be nice were the Irish authorities actually provided a clear, consistent and well-defined map of all one-off payments and receipts… but then the picture of the fiscal adjustment would not have been as pretty as our politicians like to claim. Still, the picture is broadly fine.

Crucially, the above is not sufficient for us to rest on our laurels. For a number of reasons, but chiefly for the reason not even mentioned in the IMF note: has anyone looked at how sustainable, over the medium (2015-2020) term the fiscal savings delivered by the Government are? I mean: we know that pay moderation agreements with public sector unions are not sustainable and even subject to automatic reversals in 2015-on, right? We also know that much of health system 'savings' are not sustainable, since these come on foot of extracting more and more cash out of ever-dwindling supply of private insurance holders. Right? What else is not sustainable? How much? What is the risk down the line? Is corporate tax revenue uplift we have seen over the last 24 months or so sustainable? Much of it seems to have come from MNCs booking more transfer pricing profits into Ireland. Is that 'sustainable'?

IMF does some 'sustainability' tests in its analysis and here is a scary chart:

Basically, note the path of the gross financing needs for Ireland through 2018. This returns us, under baseline (no new shocks) scenario back to the situation in 2018 where financing needs of the Exchequer are slightly above the needs in 2013. This is assuming GDP is growing 2.5% annually in real terms 2015-2018. And this is incorporating the 'savings' achieved from the Promissory Notes. And this is after we impose agreed target cuts of 2014-2015. We are swimming faster and faster to be thrown back, not even to stay put.

Now, tweak few assumptions:

So in Constant PB Scenario, the change is with no 2014-2015 'austerity' factored in, which is boring stuff. But the exciting stuff is the 'Historical Scenario' where things slide back to 'normal' on growth and government deficits:

 The outcome of the above in two charts:
1) Public debt explodes

2) Financing needs of the Government explode too

Care to argue now we can afford a 'stimulus'? As Harry Callahan put it: "Go on, punk, make my day!"

Any source

6/9/2013: Euromoney Country Risk Survey: Upgrading Irish Banking Sector Risks Outlook

Some good news for Ireland out of a number of surveys today. First, BlackRock Investment Institute survey of country experts shows Ireland improving economic outlook 6 months forward - details here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/09/692013-blackrock-institute-survey-north.html

Now, Euromoney Country Risk survey shows significant improvements in market experts assessment of Irish banking sector stability:

While both reflect opinions of experts, including experts within the specific sectors, the two are good indicators of the general direction toward gradual improvement in country economic outlook. Let's hope the Budget 2014 and mortgages arrears workouts do not derail this trend.

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5/9/2013: Sunday Times, September 1: Mortgages Defaults & Arrears

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from September 1, 2013.


As the great 17th century German mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz said: "There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposites are possible."  In other words, facts can be contradicted, properly structured reasoning cannot.

Recent debate in Ireland surrounding the issue of mortgages arrears and strategic defaults is the case in point. Based on simple extrapolations of evidence collected in the economies with regulatory and social environments largely alien to Ireland, it clashes with the very logic of the regulatory and policy changes we have put in place.

The conjecture is that between 20 and 40 percent of all mortgages arrears in Ireland are 'strategic' in nature. Most likely, this is an over-exaggeration, although we do not know with certainty. However, the incontrovertible truth that this conjecture helps to obscure is that the mortgages arrears crisis is structural and unyielding to the solutions proposed so far. The reason tells us that the mortgages arrears crisis can only be dealt with through the means of a systematic resolution approach.


To-date, no bank in Ireland has completed a full assessment of the extent of strategic defaults amongst the mortgages in arrears held on its books. In the end of Q2 2013, Irish banks held 100,920 restructured mortgages loans. We do not know how many of these relate to strategic defaults. The banks failure to report actual hard numbers suggests that they have not succeeded in identifying many such cases. Thus, factually, five years into the mortgages crisis, we have no evidence as to whether or not strategic arrears are a widespread problem. This lack of evidence is either down to the banks own choices not to analyse the data or their unwillingness to report the results of their analysis.

As the result, we lack not only the crucial evidence to tell how many borrowers are tempting to game the system, but also any knowledge as to what might be driving them to do so.

Finance literature defines strategic defaults as a scenario where mortgagees can afford to pay their mortgage bill, but opt not to do so because walking away from the loan offers them a chance to reduce their financial losses over time. Under this definition, strategic defaults generally arise in the cases of severe negative equity.

Do we have strategic defaulters in Ireland? Reason suggests the answer to this question is yes we do. Is the problem as large as to cover 20 to 40 percent of all distressed borrowers? Logic implies that the answer to this question is no.

Suppose the claim of massive strategic defaults was true. Given property prices dynamics in Ireland over the last 6 years, this means that the bulk of such defaults should have occurred back around the 2010-2011, before the rate of property prices declines slowed down substantially. In terms of mortgages arrears data, the above suggests that arrears of over 360 days duration would be more likely candidates for representing strategic defaults. This is further supported by the fact that over the last 12-15 months, Irish authorities have stepped up the rhetoric against the alleged abusers of the system, and implemented well-publicised legislative and regulatory changes, such as the Personal Insolvency Bill, limiting the incentives for such behaviour.

Now, let's do some sums. Based on the Central Bank data, if strategic defaults were really covering between 20 and 40 percent of total mortgages arrears in Ireland, the number of such cases will be somewhere between 36,000 and 73,000 accounts. These would amount to between 48 and 96 percent of all accounts that are in arrears for over 360 days in the country. In other words, based on these claims, at least half of all longer-term arrears in the country could be suspected of being in a strategic default.

That's pretty extreme of a statement to be plausible. Crucially, such a claim is not consistent with what we can expect from the changes in policies and increased banks scrutiny. More likely, strategic defaults problem is more prevalent in the buy-to-let segment of the credit markets and here it might reach, say 20 percent of all loans in arrears. This would suggest that across all mortgages, including primary residences, there may be some 22,000-25,000 suspect mortgages or just 12 percent of all accounts in arrears. This would be a significant number, but a far cry from the claims put forward by the banks and some analysts.


However, the strategic arrears argument is just a red herring, designed to draw our attention away from ‘the truth of reasoning’, to use Leibniz’s terminology, that clearly shows that Irish mortgages arrears crisis is continuing unabated.

Quarter on quarter, defaults are up across all categories of mortgages, by numbers of accounts, outstanding volumes of loans and levels of built up arrears. Year on year the arrears are rising at double-digit rates. Total arrears now number 182,840 accounts, representing EUR36.6 billion in outstanding loans. The latter figure is growing at almost 10 percent annually. Given current property valuations and the costs of recovery on foreclosed mortgages, reported by the banks to-date, these represent a system-wide loss of ca EUR11-12 billion, hidden on the books. That is before we factor in the inevitable adverse impact of mass-repossessions on the market prices or high costs of personal insolvency resolution.

For Irish banks (as opposed to foreign banks) the above potential losses are closer to EUR6.5-7.5 billion. March 2011 stress tests were based on the Central Bank 2011-2013 projected losses of EUR5.8-9.5 billion for mortgages across Irish banks. In other words, the scenario that the 2011-2013 actual losses booked by the banks, plus the potential losses built up in the arrears will exceed the 2011 stress tests' capital allocations is now highly probable.


The only hope of avoiding another banking crisis, therefore, is that the system can somehow delay recognising the arrears-related losses. The argument that there are huge strategic default numbers hidden in arrears figures helps this, as it suggests that the banks can recover the losses associated with these abuses.

Alas, the strategic defaults are unlikely to be significant enough to help the banks. At the same time, it is hard to imagine that a significant delay to losses recognition can be brought to bear by the policy changes put in place to deal with the mortgages arrears.

Currently, banks hold 1,503 repossessed properties, a number that is still tiny compared to the overall default rates, signaled by mortgages over 720 days in arrears, which number 39,093 accounts and amount to EUR9,358 billion in lending. Thus, over a quarter of all mortgages in arrears are now in default for more than 2 years continually. Many of these are non-reparable. The rates of recovery on these mortgages are unlikely to be more than 40-50 cents on the euro.

Amortising such losses over six-to-seven years period - as envisaged under the reformed personal insolvency regime - may not be an option as to-date the regulators and the banks have been serially failing to deliver sustainable, long-term solutions to arrears.

Data on mortgages that have been restructured by the banks shows that restructuring of the loans is proceeding without any major change in either the mix of solutions offered or the rates of improvement on arrears achieved. At the end of June, only 55 percent of all restructured loans were not in arrears, which is virtually unchanged compared to Q3 2012, the earliest quarter for which we have comparable data.

The risk of default for restructured mortgages is even more significant when we consider the types of arrangements put in place in restructuring. Some 50 percent of all restructurings involve temporary switches to interest only payments or reduced payments of capital component. Eight out of ten restructured mortgages give only temporary reprieve to the borrowers. In effect, of the total of 21,563 principal residences accounts restructured through the end of June 2013, around 20,520 accounts have been restructured so as to potentially either increase or leave unaltered the overall volume of debt over the life-time of the mortgage. Instead of reducing debt burden, our 'solutions' to the mortgages crisis are increasing it.

The overall levels of mortgages that are at risk of default or defaulted continues to climb. Total number of mortgages at risk currently stands at 239,834 accounts, up 11.3 percent year on year in Q2 2013. These represent ca EUR47 billion worth of mortgages or more than one third of all residential lending in the country, up on 29.5 percent a year ago. The systemic risk to the system is rising despite some nascent stabilisation experienced in the property prices and overall macroeconomic conditions, and despite the historically low cost of credit.

The economy is hurling at a breakneck speed toward mass households insolvencies and large scale repossessions over the next 1-3 years. The logic of reality is constantly negating the factoids of the official analysis.

To break this vicious cycle we need to change our modus operandi.

Firstly, we must produce an independent and credible assessment of the problem of strategic defaults. The end-game here should be putting in place a system of evidence-based monitoring and evaluation of defaulting borrowers that is transparent, independent of the banks and accessible to all those involved in structuring long-term solutions. Anyone found genuinely guilty of gaming the system must be forced to bear the full burden of their actions.

Secondly, we need to set a mandatory, clearly priced and transparently administered menu of long-term solutions. All banks must be compelled to offer these to their borrowers.

Thirdly, we need to put in place a system of independent oversight and arbitration over the solutions offered by the banks.

Without swiftly dealing with the strategic defaults and with the problem of structuring, pricing and deploying long-term solutions, Ireland is risking a repeat of the acute banking crisis over 2014-2016. Navigating the world of contingent facts requires more than extrapolating foreign studies to domestic environment. It requires proper logic and reasoning as the backing to policies and systems we deploy.

BOX-OUT:

This week, the OECD published an assessment of the effects of immigration on the member states economies. On average, across the OECD, immigrants contribute positively to the host countries' exchequers, with a net contribution of 0.4-0.57 percent of GDP. In today's Ireland immigrants' contribution to the state purse, net of benefits received, is negative at -0.23 to -0.39 percent of GDP. There is no discernible difference between native and foreign born employment rates in Ireland in 2012. There is a relatively large difference in unemployment rates between the native- and foreign-born sub-populations, that is especially pronounced for women. OECD data puts Ireland in the 8th worst position in the OECD in terms of labour markets effects of immigration and the second worst position in terms of the immigration effects on public finances. Given the fact that Ireland is continuously attracting large numbers of highly-skilled, fully employed, young and tax-compliant professionals, the above findings suggest that Irish aggregate figures are more reflective of the economic impact of the two other major cohorts of immigrants. These are: immigrants who arrived in 2001-2008 from the EU Accession states and those who arrive for family reunification reasons. However, per OECD data, the latter cohort, actually makes a larger positive contributors to the state finances any other type of the household, including the native households. This leaves immigrants from the EU Accession states, most severely hit by the collapse of building and construction and domestic services sectors in Irish economy during the crisis, as the cohort behind the overall negative findings. The point is that, traditionally, stock of immigrants in a host economy acts as one of the automatic stabilisers - a factor that adjusts on its own to reflect the prevailing economic conditions, shrinking in the recession and expanding in recoveries. In modern Ireland, one of the legacies of the 2001-2007 bubble, is that instead of stabilising economic activity, immigration might have acted to amplify the crisis.

Any source

30/8/2013: Hypo-Depfa Saga

One of the best articles on Hypo-Depfa fiasco I've seen to-date anywhere!

http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/financial-services/near-collapse-of-german-bank-and-its-irish-subsidiary-shrouded-in-mystery-1.1509849r via @DerekinBerlin and @IrishTimes

Key quotes (for me, personally):

"Sitting in his Frankfurt office, in the shadow of Deutsche Bank’s twin towers, the 75 year-old Bavarian says the mainstream view in German finance circles – that Depfa sank HRE – is not strictly correct. “HRE would have gone down on its own, because of its own business,” he says, a view he formed during a hectic year studying HRE’s books."

It was clear from the beginning of the Hypo collapse that aside from Depfa, German lender was all over the shop in terms of loans it was issuing, its own funding was no different from the market consensus model, which relied on a toxic mix of medium term and short term funding sources exacerbating maturity mismatch risk with liquidity risk.

"Six months before the end, in early 2008, German financial regulator BaFin asked experts at the Bundesbank to conduct a full audit of all HRE operations. Its final audit report warns about “serious deficits” right across the group’s structures – from Dublin to Munich – particularly in the division supposed to assess risk of investments worth around €400 billion. ...employees were often unable to answer questions about the bank’s activities. ...HRE executives had no idea what was going on at their bank – either in Germany, or in their Dublin subsidiary, Depfa – because they had “no adequate, timely presentation of the actual financial situation”."

You have to just love the incompetence of the German financial authorities. Having received a report listing 49 breaches of regulations by Hypo-Depfa, in July 2008 (amidst already raging liquidity crisis worldwide), German BaFin "demanded quarterly progress reports on remedial action. Six weeks later, HRE and Depfa went over the edge."

A sense of BaFin being run by Dublin's FinReg or their equivalent is ever present.

Any source

19/7/2013: Spain's Bad Loans: Heading for the Eurotroit solution?

Spanish banks bad loans ratio of all assets for May 2013:

H/T: Ioan Smith @moved_average

The Eurotroit keeps rolling on... Notice how Spain has by now largely erased the reductions in bad loans driven by assets shifts to 'bad bank' Sareb (EUR50.45bn portfolio, with 76,000 empty housing units, 6,300 rented homes, 14,900 plots of land and 84,300 loans). Spanish bad loans as a percentage of total credit rose from10.5% in March to over 11.2% in May.

And they will continue rising.

That's because in Spain, ultimate level of bad loans is going to be closer to Ireland's, where over 50% of SME loans are non-performing, over 25.8% of all mortgages are non-performing or at risk of default, and as of June 2013, 24.8% of all loans were non-performing, against EuroTanic's average 7.5-7.6% (EUR920bn or so). Irish numbers exclude Nama.

So even with the sunshine and sea, Costa del Concrete is going to cost Spain over 20% in terms of bad loans ratio in the end.

Any source

23/4/2013: Updating the cost of banking crisis data

Nice update from the ECB on the cumulated cost of the banking crisis in Europe, now available through 2012. The net effect, summing up all assumed sovereign liabilities relating to the crisis, including contingent liabilities, and subtracting asset values associated with these liabilities are shown (by country) in the chart below:

Note the special place of Ireland in the above.

For the euro area as a whole, net liabilities relating to the crisis back in 2007 stood at EUR 0.00 (EUR36.72 billion for EU27). By the end of 2012 these have risen to EUR 740.15 billion (EUR 734.23 billion for EU27).

Net revenue losses for Government arising from the banking sector rescues, per ECB are:

Any source