Via BusinessInsider: http://www.businessinsider.com/europes-cities-in-one-chart-2013-10 Here's a chart showing the impact of the crisis on major cities:
Notice the position of Dublin as the second or third most adversely impacted city. And notice our position in terms of GVA (Gross Value Added) growth. We also represent the worst-impacted small city in the sample. Stripping out the positive effects of growth in MNCs-driven services exports and superficial transfer pricing boom delivered by the likes of Amazon, Google et al, we would be much closer to Athens in terms of overall impact.
Any source
Showing posts with label Irish economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish economy. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 29, 2013
Monday, October 7, 2013
8/10/2013: German Voters Go For Status Quo... Redux: Sunday Times September 29, 2013
This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from September 29, 2013.
By any measure, last Sunday's German elections highlighted a resounding failure of the country electorate to connect with reality. Despite returning a number of historical outcomes, the voters reaffirmed the passive-conservative leadership mandate exercised by Angela Merkel since 2009. As the result, German policies are now likely to drift even farther away from the immediate needs of the euro area periphery, risking a renewal of the euro area crisis and a slowdown in the already less-than ambitious speed of European reforms. None of this is good news for Ireland.
The historical nature of the 2013 German elections is highlighted by the fact that Angela Merkel became the first euro area leader to be reelected as the head of state since the beginning of the Great Recession. And she has done it twice: first some 12 months into the crisis in 2009 and now 5 years from its onset. Ms. Merkel won the highest number of votes for her CDU/CSU party in 23 years. And she became the first German leader since the golden days of Konrad Adenauer back in 1961 to personally dominate the elections, instead of standing in the shadow of her party. Individually, all of these are rare events in modern German history. Taken together, they are probably unprecedented.
But herein lies the problem for all of us living outside Germany. The elections of 2013 have produced a strong mandate for doing nothing new when it comes to either the euro area or the larger Union reforms. The Chancellor re-elect retook the Bundeskanzleramt on a mandate of being a 'safe pair of hands'. The campaign her party waged focused on such important topics as charging foreign drivers for using autobahns. Instead of debating the core issues faced by the EU, and the role of Germany in this mess, voters largely engaged in navel-gazing. Satisfied with their relatively well-performing economy and receding immediate danger to the euro, they endorsed the leadership devoid of ideas, alternative views and aspirations. Not surprisingly, philosopher Jurgen Habermas declared the 2013 general election campaign a "collective failure" of the elites.
This means that the German elections left the core problems of the euro crisis unaddressed, raising the specter of renewed uncertainty about the future of the common currency area. This concern became immediately visible this week.
On Monday, ECB's Mario Draghi rushed to compensate for the policy paralysis signaled out of Germany by stating that the ECB is ready to deploy a new round of quantitative easing in the form of the third Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO3). To remind you, the first two rounds of LTROs were the ECB’s ‘pre-nuclear option’ response to strategic threats to the euro area economy in late 2010-early 2011. The ‘nuclear option’ was the subsequent announcement of the stand-by quantitative easing programme, known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Mr. Draghi mentioning the prospect of renewing the LTRO scheme suggests that the ECB expects no change in euro area policies in the aftermath of last week’s elections.
Acknowledging this, Draghi also tried to push aside the pesky issue of the Greek Bailout 3.0. And in a direct reflection of the Berlin’s preferences, Draghi also downplayed the possibility of the ESM being licensed to provide financing cover for future bank failures.
Mr Draghi’s precautionary moves were timed perfectly. Following the elections, sovereign yields on all peripheral countries’ bonds rose relative to German bunds. Credit default swaps – insurance contracts underwriting sovereign bonds – also crept up. The markets are not buying the ‘return to status quo’ story as good news. This was contrasted by the domestic news which saw the German economic sentiment, as measured by the CESIfo index of economic conditions rise for the third month in a row. This marks fifteenth consecutive quarter of the CESIfo index reading above historical average. In contrast, euro area economic conditions index has been stuck below its historical average levels for eight quarters in a row through this September.
Since 2009 elections, Chancellor Merkel held back from directly leading the euro area and instead opted repeatedly to wait for an escalation of the crises before responding with un-prepared, often ad hoc and wrong-footed solutions. Best examples of this approach to leadership are the EU's failures in Cyprus and Greece. Both are directly linked to Ms. Merkel’s prevarication in the face of escalating crises. All were driven by swings in domestic public opinion, rather than by any cohesive principles.
For Ireland, this mode of leadership spells lack of progress on key issues.
Gauging German public opinion there is currently zero appetite to shift away from the pre-elections status quo in which the Irish crisis is seen as largely self-induced and peripheral to German interests. This means that Germany is likely to continue supporting Irish debt sustainability rhetorically, while opposing practical resolution of the debt overhang. This week, Ms. Merkel gave another loud endorsement to Irish Government policies during the crisis. As she did so, the Irish Government – usually not known for its skeptical pragmatism – was actively pushing the timeline for banking debts problem resolution out into the later months of 2014. My gut feeling is that we can expect this timeline to stretch beyond 2015. Instead of allowing restructuring of our banking debts, Berlin will nod approvingly to a precautionary line of credit for Ireland via set-aside stand-by facility at the ESM. This credit will be provided on current ESM funding terms, some 1 percent below the cost of IMF funding and with longer maturities. Which is the good news.
In exchange for this token gesture we will be required to strictly adhere to fiscal adjustment targets for 2015. We will be further subjected to a new multi-annual fiscal programme stretching into 2018-2020 to be supervised by the EU Commission. ECB – by proxy, the German government – will be watching from the shadows.
Meanwhile, as Mr. Draghi statement this week indicates, Germany will block ESM from having any powers in dealing with future banking crises. Our retrospective banks debt deal will then have to wait until a new funding facility, most likely administered by the ECB, comes into place. Pencil that for sometime in 2016. Pushing legacy debts incurred by the Exchequer as the result of rescuing our banks into the hands of the ECB is likely to cost us. Frankfurt can, and potentially will, demand something in return for this. One thing the ECB can ask for is accelerated sales of the Central Bank-held Government bonds (the fallout from the Promissory Notes deal done earlier this year). The ECB already has the power to do so. It also has a direct incentive: the bonds are set against our banks borrowings from the euro system. Of course, this will mean that we will be trading one debt for another, as accelerated sales of bonds will erode the temporary fiscal ‘savings’ achieved by the Promo Notes restructuring.
But the cost of the EU/German ‘assistance’ for Ireland will most likely extend further than bonds sales acceleration and new fiscal targets setting. German political agenda is well-anchored to continued saber-rattling on the need for corporate tax harmonization across the EU. With the 2009-2011 Franco-German tax harmonisation initiative all but dead, the focus in the next two-three years will shift toward advancing the consolidated common corporate tax base (CCCTB) proposals that suit German interests more than any other form of tax coordination. Based on her record to-date, Ms. Merkel is a fan of the CCCTB as are all of her potential coalition partners and the German voters.
German elections are also promising to create less certainty as to the structural reforms in the European Union space. Last Sunday’s results produced strong votes for the anti-euro party, Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD). The party also did well in the previously held local elections. The new Merkel-led coalition will have to show caution when facing any prospect of further harmonisation and consolidation of power in Brussels.
When it comes to structural reforms, German public prefers for euro area to focus on specific hard fiscal targets and on replicating Germany's own structural reforms of the 1990s. While such reforms can be beneficent to the euro area peripheral states, for Ireland they offer only marginal gains. German reforms of the 1990s have focused on two core policy pillars: increasing flexibility of the labour markets and decreasing the burden of the welfare state. These came at a cost of continued consolidation of German economy around larger enterprises and suppression of domestic demand and household investment.
Ireland today requires some reforms in the social welfare system. But we also need to break up our dominant market players in the domestic sectors and to increase our households’ spending and investment.
In short, in the wake of the German elections, there is preciously little that Ireland can expect in terms of the European support for our recovery. Europe, with German blessing, will most likely lend us a hand to help us out of the 'safe' boat of the Troika programme. Thereafter, swimming in the turbulent waters of the Eurozone crisis will be up to us. Let's hope Budget 2014 provides generously for flotation vests.
BOX-OUT:
Marking the fifth anniversary of the Banking Guarantee of September 2008, there are plenty of stocktaking exercises going around. Yet, for all the ‘Fail’ marks being rightly handed out to the Guarantee, all signs in the streets suggest we have learned next to nothing from our past errors. This week offers at least two such examples. Firstly, the crisis showed that a non-transparent system of monitoring and managing financial risks will result in the connected-few gaming the entire system. This week, Minister Noonan intervened in the process of winding down the IBRC, bending the rules that normally apply to company liquidations. Granting anonymity to the funders of the toxic banks comes as a priority in this country. Unintended consequence of this is that it also perpetuates the cronyist relationship between the financial services and the state – exactly the outcome we should have learned to avoid. Secondly, we know that principles-based regulations require swift, robust and unambiguous enforcement. Also this week, the Central Bank effectively shut the door on any further investigations into Anglo dealings with the regulators that could have arisen from the infamous Anglo Tapes. Five years in, there are zero prosecutions, and scores of closed investigations. To paraphrase Bon Jovi’s famous refrain: the less we learn, the more things stay the same…
Any source
By any measure, last Sunday's German elections highlighted a resounding failure of the country electorate to connect with reality. Despite returning a number of historical outcomes, the voters reaffirmed the passive-conservative leadership mandate exercised by Angela Merkel since 2009. As the result, German policies are now likely to drift even farther away from the immediate needs of the euro area periphery, risking a renewal of the euro area crisis and a slowdown in the already less-than ambitious speed of European reforms. None of this is good news for Ireland.
The historical nature of the 2013 German elections is highlighted by the fact that Angela Merkel became the first euro area leader to be reelected as the head of state since the beginning of the Great Recession. And she has done it twice: first some 12 months into the crisis in 2009 and now 5 years from its onset. Ms. Merkel won the highest number of votes for her CDU/CSU party in 23 years. And she became the first German leader since the golden days of Konrad Adenauer back in 1961 to personally dominate the elections, instead of standing in the shadow of her party. Individually, all of these are rare events in modern German history. Taken together, they are probably unprecedented.
But herein lies the problem for all of us living outside Germany. The elections of 2013 have produced a strong mandate for doing nothing new when it comes to either the euro area or the larger Union reforms. The Chancellor re-elect retook the Bundeskanzleramt on a mandate of being a 'safe pair of hands'. The campaign her party waged focused on such important topics as charging foreign drivers for using autobahns. Instead of debating the core issues faced by the EU, and the role of Germany in this mess, voters largely engaged in navel-gazing. Satisfied with their relatively well-performing economy and receding immediate danger to the euro, they endorsed the leadership devoid of ideas, alternative views and aspirations. Not surprisingly, philosopher Jurgen Habermas declared the 2013 general election campaign a "collective failure" of the elites.
This means that the German elections left the core problems of the euro crisis unaddressed, raising the specter of renewed uncertainty about the future of the common currency area. This concern became immediately visible this week.
On Monday, ECB's Mario Draghi rushed to compensate for the policy paralysis signaled out of Germany by stating that the ECB is ready to deploy a new round of quantitative easing in the form of the third Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO3). To remind you, the first two rounds of LTROs were the ECB’s ‘pre-nuclear option’ response to strategic threats to the euro area economy in late 2010-early 2011. The ‘nuclear option’ was the subsequent announcement of the stand-by quantitative easing programme, known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Mr. Draghi mentioning the prospect of renewing the LTRO scheme suggests that the ECB expects no change in euro area policies in the aftermath of last week’s elections.
Acknowledging this, Draghi also tried to push aside the pesky issue of the Greek Bailout 3.0. And in a direct reflection of the Berlin’s preferences, Draghi also downplayed the possibility of the ESM being licensed to provide financing cover for future bank failures.
Mr Draghi’s precautionary moves were timed perfectly. Following the elections, sovereign yields on all peripheral countries’ bonds rose relative to German bunds. Credit default swaps – insurance contracts underwriting sovereign bonds – also crept up. The markets are not buying the ‘return to status quo’ story as good news. This was contrasted by the domestic news which saw the German economic sentiment, as measured by the CESIfo index of economic conditions rise for the third month in a row. This marks fifteenth consecutive quarter of the CESIfo index reading above historical average. In contrast, euro area economic conditions index has been stuck below its historical average levels for eight quarters in a row through this September.
Since 2009 elections, Chancellor Merkel held back from directly leading the euro area and instead opted repeatedly to wait for an escalation of the crises before responding with un-prepared, often ad hoc and wrong-footed solutions. Best examples of this approach to leadership are the EU's failures in Cyprus and Greece. Both are directly linked to Ms. Merkel’s prevarication in the face of escalating crises. All were driven by swings in domestic public opinion, rather than by any cohesive principles.
For Ireland, this mode of leadership spells lack of progress on key issues.
Gauging German public opinion there is currently zero appetite to shift away from the pre-elections status quo in which the Irish crisis is seen as largely self-induced and peripheral to German interests. This means that Germany is likely to continue supporting Irish debt sustainability rhetorically, while opposing practical resolution of the debt overhang. This week, Ms. Merkel gave another loud endorsement to Irish Government policies during the crisis. As she did so, the Irish Government – usually not known for its skeptical pragmatism – was actively pushing the timeline for banking debts problem resolution out into the later months of 2014. My gut feeling is that we can expect this timeline to stretch beyond 2015. Instead of allowing restructuring of our banking debts, Berlin will nod approvingly to a precautionary line of credit for Ireland via set-aside stand-by facility at the ESM. This credit will be provided on current ESM funding terms, some 1 percent below the cost of IMF funding and with longer maturities. Which is the good news.
In exchange for this token gesture we will be required to strictly adhere to fiscal adjustment targets for 2015. We will be further subjected to a new multi-annual fiscal programme stretching into 2018-2020 to be supervised by the EU Commission. ECB – by proxy, the German government – will be watching from the shadows.
Meanwhile, as Mr. Draghi statement this week indicates, Germany will block ESM from having any powers in dealing with future banking crises. Our retrospective banks debt deal will then have to wait until a new funding facility, most likely administered by the ECB, comes into place. Pencil that for sometime in 2016. Pushing legacy debts incurred by the Exchequer as the result of rescuing our banks into the hands of the ECB is likely to cost us. Frankfurt can, and potentially will, demand something in return for this. One thing the ECB can ask for is accelerated sales of the Central Bank-held Government bonds (the fallout from the Promissory Notes deal done earlier this year). The ECB already has the power to do so. It also has a direct incentive: the bonds are set against our banks borrowings from the euro system. Of course, this will mean that we will be trading one debt for another, as accelerated sales of bonds will erode the temporary fiscal ‘savings’ achieved by the Promo Notes restructuring.
But the cost of the EU/German ‘assistance’ for Ireland will most likely extend further than bonds sales acceleration and new fiscal targets setting. German political agenda is well-anchored to continued saber-rattling on the need for corporate tax harmonization across the EU. With the 2009-2011 Franco-German tax harmonisation initiative all but dead, the focus in the next two-three years will shift toward advancing the consolidated common corporate tax base (CCCTB) proposals that suit German interests more than any other form of tax coordination. Based on her record to-date, Ms. Merkel is a fan of the CCCTB as are all of her potential coalition partners and the German voters.
German elections are also promising to create less certainty as to the structural reforms in the European Union space. Last Sunday’s results produced strong votes for the anti-euro party, Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD). The party also did well in the previously held local elections. The new Merkel-led coalition will have to show caution when facing any prospect of further harmonisation and consolidation of power in Brussels.
When it comes to structural reforms, German public prefers for euro area to focus on specific hard fiscal targets and on replicating Germany's own structural reforms of the 1990s. While such reforms can be beneficent to the euro area peripheral states, for Ireland they offer only marginal gains. German reforms of the 1990s have focused on two core policy pillars: increasing flexibility of the labour markets and decreasing the burden of the welfare state. These came at a cost of continued consolidation of German economy around larger enterprises and suppression of domestic demand and household investment.
Ireland today requires some reforms in the social welfare system. But we also need to break up our dominant market players in the domestic sectors and to increase our households’ spending and investment.
In short, in the wake of the German elections, there is preciously little that Ireland can expect in terms of the European support for our recovery. Europe, with German blessing, will most likely lend us a hand to help us out of the 'safe' boat of the Troika programme. Thereafter, swimming in the turbulent waters of the Eurozone crisis will be up to us. Let's hope Budget 2014 provides generously for flotation vests.
BOX-OUT:
Marking the fifth anniversary of the Banking Guarantee of September 2008, there are plenty of stocktaking exercises going around. Yet, for all the ‘Fail’ marks being rightly handed out to the Guarantee, all signs in the streets suggest we have learned next to nothing from our past errors. This week offers at least two such examples. Firstly, the crisis showed that a non-transparent system of monitoring and managing financial risks will result in the connected-few gaming the entire system. This week, Minister Noonan intervened in the process of winding down the IBRC, bending the rules that normally apply to company liquidations. Granting anonymity to the funders of the toxic banks comes as a priority in this country. Unintended consequence of this is that it also perpetuates the cronyist relationship between the financial services and the state – exactly the outcome we should have learned to avoid. Secondly, we know that principles-based regulations require swift, robust and unambiguous enforcement. Also this week, the Central Bank effectively shut the door on any further investigations into Anglo dealings with the regulators that could have arisen from the infamous Anglo Tapes. Five years in, there are zero prosecutions, and scores of closed investigations. To paraphrase Bon Jovi’s famous refrain: the less we learn, the more things stay the same…
Thursday, October 3, 2013
3/10/2013: Irish PMIs - are they meaningful?
Having covered Services and Manufacturing PMIs (see links here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/10/3102013-services-and-manufacturing-pmis.html) in terms of Q3 2013 averages, let's have a reminder as to the links to actual growth in Irish GDP and GNP these series have.
Two charts covering through Q2 2013:
Thus, overall:
- Changes q/q in Manufacturing PMIs have only a weak correlation with actual real (constant prices) GDP and GNP changes q/q: R-squares of just 35.6% and 29.4% respectively when we remove the constant factor (which is not significant by itself at any rate). This is weak to say the least.
- Changes q/q in Services PMIs have only a very weak correlation with actual real (constant prices) GDP and GNP changes q/q: R-squares of just 16.4% and 17.6% respectively when we remove the constant factor (which is significant). This is very poor.
- With positive intercepts of 0.0023 for GDP and 0.0024 for GNP, the Services PMI R-square rises to 23.7% for GDP and 22.7% for GNP. Once again, no change to the above conclusion.
The above suggests that a significant component of both PMIs come from transfer pricing and not real economic activity on the ground. Or put differently, the PMIs are not that exceptionally meaningful indicators of actual levels of activity in the economy and are only weakly-significant in indicating the direction of that activity.
Note: this is quarterly averages data, not much more volatile data based on monthly series. Which puts to question monthly movements in PMIs even more...
3/10/2013: Services and Manufacturing PMIs for Ireland: September 2013
In the previous posts I covered separately both Service PMI for Ireland and Manufacturing PMI (released by Markit & Investec). As noted, both series show strong performance in September. Here is the combined analysis:
Both Services and Manufacturing PMIs are now above their historical crisis-period averages. Manufacturing PMI is slightly ahead (0.1 points) of its historical pre-crisis average since May 2000 when both series start running coincidently. Services PMI is now slightly below its historical pre-crisis average.
Services PMI have broken out of the flat trend and are now trending up for the last 12 months. However, Manufacturing PMI continues to move side-ways, although on average remaining positive.
Two major points: September 2013 reading puts both indices at statistically significant levels above 50.0, which is the first such occurrence since February 2011:
In addition, we are seeing stronger positive correlation between the two indices (the 12mo rolling correlation below is only indicative) established since February 2013 low:
In other words, both sides of the economy are now performing better, but we need this momentum to be sustained over 2-3 months to see serious feed-through into actual economic activity figures.
Tuesday, October 1, 2013
1/10/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: September 2013
Some good readings from Irish Manufacturing PMI (Investec-sponsored Markit data) for September:
- Headline PMI is at 52.7 up on 52.0 in August and the highest reading since 53.9 in July 2012.
- Critically, this appears to be the first statistically significant reading above 50.0 since November 2012.
- I use 'appears' above since we have no formal analysis from Markit on this (Investec don't do analysis). The distribution is Laplace. August reading was close to being statistically significant.
- In terms of trend, Q1 2013 average reading was 50.13, Q2 2013 at 49.33, Q3 now reads 51.9.
- 12mo MA is at 50.8.
- 3mo MA through September 2013 is at 51.9, which is below the same period 2012 (52.2), but ahead of 2011 (49.2) and slightly ahead of 2010 (50.4).
Now, it appears we have broken the downward trend at last. Index volatility (36mo rolling) has fallen slightly to around 2.3 in terms of 3mo average through September, which is close to historical average of 2.4 and is well below the crisis-period average of 3.4. Positive skew on change is at 3mo average of +0.75 (for deviations from 50.0) and this contrasts with a negative -0.34 skew for historical data and -0.25 skew for crisis period data. So let's call it a trend reversal for the short term:
Sadly, nothing else to report, since Investec/Markit continue to push out data-less releases. Wish I could tell you about employment, exports orders, total orders... but there is not a single number in the press release, only comments.
Thursday, September 5, 2013
5/9/2013: Irish Services Sector Activity Index: July 2013
Monthly Services Activity Index from the cSO is out for July. Some interesting movements in the series.
Overall, still solid performance in the Services sector, with monthly (seasonally adjusted) changes not exactly stellar, but gains of the previous months continue to carry the sector to annual expansion.
Any source
- Wholesale and retail trade sub-sector activity expanded m/m on seasonally adjusted basis by 2.46% in July 2013, having posted a m/m decline of 1.49% back in June 2013. 3mo MA through July 2013 was down 2.19% on 3mo MA through July 2012 and 6mo MA is down 4.21% y/y.
- Transport and storage sub-sector posted a m/m expansion of 1.86% in July 2013, following a contraction in June 2013 of 2.08%. 3mo MA is up 3.84% y/y and 6mo MA is up 4.36%.
- Accommodation and food services sub-sector activity contracted 0.76% in July 2013 m/m, having posted an expansion of 1.06% in June 2013. 3mo MA is now up just 0.32% y/y and 6mo MA is up 1.27% y/y.
- Administrative and support services sub-sector activity shrunk 1.24% m/m in July 2013, having posted 5.25% growth in June 2013. 3mo MA is now up a massive 23.76% y/y and 6mo MA is up 22.04%.
- Information and communication sub-sector activity shrunk 4.01% m/m in July 2013, having posted growth of 1.71% in June. 3mo MA is now up 8.01% y/y and 6mo MA is up 9.23% y/y.
- Professional, scientific and technical activities sub-sector is down 4.68% m/m in July, having posted an 1.74% expansion in June. 3mo MA is down 6.64% y/y and 6mo MA is down 3.23% y/y.
Lastly, overall index:
- Services sector activity fell 0.82% m/m in July after posting growth of 0.37% m/m in June 2013.
- 3mo MA through July 2013 was up 2.73% y/y against previous 3mo period MA growth of 2.09% y/y.
- 6mo MA is up 2.41% y/y.
Overall, still solid performance in the Services sector, with monthly (seasonally adjusted) changes not exactly stellar, but gains of the previous months continue to carry the sector to annual expansion.
Monday, September 2, 2013
2/9/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: August 2013
Markit/Investec Irish Manufacturing PMI out for August today. As usual - no data on sub-indices, no statistical analysis released.
Headline reading improved to 52.0 in August, up on 51.0 in July, marking the highest reading since November 2012 when it stood at 52.4 and the third highest reading in 12 months. Release from Markit is here. My analysis as follows:
Note strong departure from 6mo MA in the chart above, which is encouraging; and in the chart below, note that we have finally reached above the crisis-period average for the index.
Another good news bit is that we have moved closer to confirming the index breakout from the downward trend that run from July 2012 through June 2013. One-two months more of this performance and we can be moving onto a new trend:
Any source
Headline reading improved to 52.0 in August, up on 51.0 in July, marking the highest reading since November 2012 when it stood at 52.4 and the third highest reading in 12 months. Release from Markit is here. My analysis as follows:
- 1.0 points gain on July is a decent number. We are now into third consecutive month of nominal seasonally-adjusted readings above 50.0. All of these are good signs.
- Another good sign: 12mo MA is now at 50.8 and 3mo MA is at 51.1. This implies that 3mo MA is ahead significantly over 48.8 reading for 3mo through May 2013. However, on a negative side, 3mo MA through August 2013 is down on 52.6 recorded for the 3mo through August 2012, although it is ahead of 3mo MA for the same period in 2011, and down on same period average for 2010.
- Cautionary signs: current reading is still below statistically significant levels (ca 52.2), although we are in a Laplace distribution (as I noted earlier, based on higher moments). Last time the index was reading statistically above 50.0 was in November 2012.
- Another note of caution: Q3 2013 to-date averages at 51.5 - nice number, but recall that in a contractionary Q1 2013, PMIs averaged above 50.1. Nonetheless, good news - the index for Q3 2013 to-date is above both Q1 and Q2 readings.
Trends illustrated:
Note strong departure from 6mo MA in the chart above, which is encouraging; and in the chart below, note that we have finally reached above the crisis-period average for the index.
Another good news bit is that we have moved closer to confirming the index breakout from the downward trend that run from July 2012 through June 2013. One-two months more of this performance and we can be moving onto a new trend:
Summary: overall, decent performance by manufacturing PMI in August.
I cannot confirm any of the statements made by Markit/Investec, and note: I have not seen Investec usual longer release so far. However, per Markit, all three main sub-sectors have posted increases in output in August, and "new orders rose for the second successive month, and at a solid pace that was the strongest since July 2012". No idea where actual indices readings are at. "Meanwhile, employment continued to rise, extending the current sequence of job creation to three months. However, the pace of increase slowed over the month." Again, no idea as per actual readings.
Thursday, August 29, 2013
30/8/2013: How's that 'credit supply' to the economy promise going?
On foot of my analysis of the credit extended to Irish Private Sector Enterprises and to SMEs (see PSEs analysis here and SMEs analysis here), I was asked if I can pool together the two datasets to provide a summary of the 'Government performance table' on both.
Here it is. All changes are referenced to Q2 2011 in levels (Euro millions) and the colour codings are: bold green marks expansion on Q2 2011, bold red - contraction.
As you can see, only two sectors of the economy experienced an overall increase in credit levels: Manufacturing and Human Health & Social Work.
As I noted in the previous post: Truth be told, neither this nor any other Government can stop the deleveraging in the Irish private sector economy and this deleveraging will have more adverse impact on SMEs than on larger enterprises. But, truth be told, the Irish Government is not exactly keen on this truth and is insisting that it can 'unlock' credit flows... Two years in, we are still waiting...
Any source
Here it is. All changes are referenced to Q2 2011 in levels (Euro millions) and the colour codings are: bold green marks expansion on Q2 2011, bold red - contraction.
As I noted in the previous post: Truth be told, neither this nor any other Government can stop the deleveraging in the Irish private sector economy and this deleveraging will have more adverse impact on SMEs than on larger enterprises. But, truth be told, the Irish Government is not exactly keen on this truth and is insisting that it can 'unlock' credit flows... Two years in, we are still waiting...
29/8/2013: Credit to SMEs in Ireland: Q2 2013
Earlier today, I debunked the myth that we are experiencing any sort of significant uptick in private sector enterprise investment on the foot of poor credit supply figures for Irish private sector enterprise. You can read my analysis on this here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/08/2982013-credit-to-private-enterprises.html. However, let us recall that the current Government came into the office rattling sabres on the high goals of setting banks straight on SMEs credit.
How are we doing on this front?
Here's a handy summary for Q2 2013 changes in credit outstanding to the SMEs (green bold marks sectors where there has been any improvement - either quarterly or annual):
Spotting any significant improvements in access to credit? Me neither.
What about longer trends? Here are the charts:
Total credit is down.
Manufacturing credit is up and off the bottom levels, but the overall levels are tiny, minuscule, irrelevant to the aggregate economy. Primary sectors credit is down over longer time range and flat since ca Q2 2011.
No love from the banks for property, construction, and now less love for financial intermediaries too.
No need to describe what's going on in wholesale, retail and hospitality sectors.
Education faring better, but at insignificant levels of activity to start with. Health is at the bottom of the empty swimming pool and not even flapping arms...
Even the 'white knights in shining armour' that are exports drivers and generators and the darlings of our development agencies: business services and ICT are starving of credit.
So run by me again: what are the banks doing to respond to the Government loud calls to do their bit for the economy, to support recovery etc? Oh, here's a table showing what happened in SME credit per sector since Q2 2011 (in bold red - sectors that saw decline in credit, in bold green - those where there was an increase in credit):
Truth be told, neither this nor any other Government can stop the deleveraging in the Irish private sector economy and this deleveraging will have more adverse impact on SMEs than on larger enterprises. But, truth be told, the Irish Government is not exactly keen on this truth and is insisting that it can 'unlock' credit flows... Two years in, we are still waiting...
Any source
How are we doing on this front?
Here's a handy summary for Q2 2013 changes in credit outstanding to the SMEs (green bold marks sectors where there has been any improvement - either quarterly or annual):
Spotting any significant improvements in access to credit? Me neither.
What about longer trends? Here are the charts:
Total credit is down.
Manufacturing credit is up and off the bottom levels, but the overall levels are tiny, minuscule, irrelevant to the aggregate economy. Primary sectors credit is down over longer time range and flat since ca Q2 2011.
No love from the banks for property, construction, and now less love for financial intermediaries too.
No need to describe what's going on in wholesale, retail and hospitality sectors.
Education faring better, but at insignificant levels of activity to start with. Health is at the bottom of the empty swimming pool and not even flapping arms...
Even the 'white knights in shining armour' that are exports drivers and generators and the darlings of our development agencies: business services and ICT are starving of credit.
So run by me again: what are the banks doing to respond to the Government loud calls to do their bit for the economy, to support recovery etc? Oh, here's a table showing what happened in SME credit per sector since Q2 2011 (in bold red - sectors that saw decline in credit, in bold green - those where there was an increase in credit):
Truth be told, neither this nor any other Government can stop the deleveraging in the Irish private sector economy and this deleveraging will have more adverse impact on SMEs than on larger enterprises. But, truth be told, the Irish Government is not exactly keen on this truth and is insisting that it can 'unlock' credit flows... Two years in, we are still waiting...
29/8/2013: Credit to Private Enterprises in Ireland: Q2 2013
Credit supply figures for credit extended to Irish businesses are out and make a depressing reading, once again.
Taken from the top, here's the summary of all latest (Q2 2013) changes:
I marked in green bold only those observations where there has been any sort of a positive movement either y/y or q/q. There are only five such subsectors: Water, Sewage & Waste Treatment, etc (although q/q the sector is again down on credit), Transport & Storage (although the sector is down y/y), Information & Communication (solid y/y rise, with a big question as to whether the credit increase is accounted for by the Eircom going back into leveraging up), Education (solid y/y gain, weak q/q growth) and Health and Social Work (down q/q, but up y/y).
We hear much about the fabled revival of fortunes in the construction sector and property investment sector. I am afraid there is none visible in the credit supply data:
Unless Russian oligarchs with suitcases of cash are rolling into town, where's the fabled 'pick up of building activity' being funded from? Mars? Or cash piles of our farmers?
Total credit is still shrinking, most critically, in the sectors excluding Financial Intermediation and Property:
Credit in Primary Industries and Manufacturing has flat-lined some 33-39 months ago and is showing no life since, which is sort of suggests that the PMIs (Manufacturing) 'boom' is a signal of skewed PMI metric, capturing more of the MNCs than of domestic activity:
When it comes to the 'brighter' spot of Transport - credit pick up is off extremely weak position:
In short, as credit is linked directly to investment activity, the above suggests continued deep-freeze in the economy through H1 2013. There seem to be no signs of revival so far, albeit caveats to this apply - this is just one indicator and it is an indicator that does not tell us much about new loans issuance as opposed to old loans expirations/maturing etc. Still, to get investment-driven growth, we need credit figures to rise. Not fall...
Any source
Taken from the top, here's the summary of all latest (Q2 2013) changes:
I marked in green bold only those observations where there has been any sort of a positive movement either y/y or q/q. There are only five such subsectors: Water, Sewage & Waste Treatment, etc (although q/q the sector is again down on credit), Transport & Storage (although the sector is down y/y), Information & Communication (solid y/y rise, with a big question as to whether the credit increase is accounted for by the Eircom going back into leveraging up), Education (solid y/y gain, weak q/q growth) and Health and Social Work (down q/q, but up y/y).
We hear much about the fabled revival of fortunes in the construction sector and property investment sector. I am afraid there is none visible in the credit supply data:
Unless Russian oligarchs with suitcases of cash are rolling into town, where's the fabled 'pick up of building activity' being funded from? Mars? Or cash piles of our farmers?
Total credit is still shrinking, most critically, in the sectors excluding Financial Intermediation and Property:
Credit in Primary Industries and Manufacturing has flat-lined some 33-39 months ago and is showing no life since, which is sort of suggests that the PMIs (Manufacturing) 'boom' is a signal of skewed PMI metric, capturing more of the MNCs than of domestic activity:
When it comes to the 'brighter' spot of Transport - credit pick up is off extremely weak position:
In short, as credit is linked directly to investment activity, the above suggests continued deep-freeze in the economy through H1 2013. There seem to be no signs of revival so far, albeit caveats to this apply - this is just one indicator and it is an indicator that does not tell us much about new loans issuance as opposed to old loans expirations/maturing etc. Still, to get investment-driven growth, we need credit figures to rise. Not fall...
Tuesday, August 13, 2013
8/13/2013: Sunday Times, August 11: Wither Middle Ireland
This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from August 11, 2013.
Recent data from Irish retailers, aggregate services indices as well as household surveys paints a picture of an economy divided in misery and fortunes. Following an already unprecedented five years of straight declines, domestic demand, stripping out one-off effects, such as weather, continues to shrink. This is the paralysed core of our economy. At the opposite side of the spectrum, pockets of strength remain within some demographic groups – namely the young and mobile professionals and debt-free older households. These form a de facto sub-economy only marginally attached to Ireland’s long-term future. With personal consumption still accounting for over half of the total annual GDP, a society torn between these two divergent drivers of domestic demand, savings and investment, is an economy at risk.
On the surface, CSO data through H1 2013 shows that Irish retail sales (excluding cars) grew modestly in June 2013 when compared to the same period a year ago. Much of this growth was due to weather effects and these are likely to strengthen even further in the third quarter. However, removing food, fuel and bars sales, core retail sales were down 1.7 percent in value and were up 0.8% percent in volume in April-June 2013, year-on-year. In other words, core sales are still being driven primarily by price declines rather than by organic growth in demand.
Meanwhile, aggregate data released this week, covering services (as opposed to sales of goods alone) showed annual declines in June 2013 in accommodation, and food and beverage services activities.
The bad news is that five years into the process of reducing household expenditures, Irish consumers are still tightening their belts. Not only discretionary spending is dropping, but demand for staples is contracting as well. At the end of H1 2013, retail sales were down on 2007 levels for both durable and non-durable household consumption items, as well as food.
This data is largely consistent with the analysis of the household budget surveys released earlier this month. These surveys showed that compared to 2009, Irish households have cut deeper into their bills in twelve months through Q3 2012. Demand for groceries, clothing and footware, recreation, health Insurance and education saw continued cutbacks. For example, in the 24 months prior to June 2011, 56 percent of Irish households cut down on food purchases. Further 51 percent cut spending in the 12 months through September 2012. Despite these already severe cutbacks, industry surveys show that Irish households are still concerned with high cost of basic consumables.
Households’ propensity to cut costs has risen in the twelve months through September 2012 compared to the 24 months period to June 2011 as those still holding onto their jobs are now shifting into deeper cost savings mode. This busts the myth that the only people forced to severely cut their spending are the unemployed and the poor. The largest proportion of severe cuts in the earlier part of the recession fell onto the shoulders of the households where at least one person was jobless, followed by students. Back then households in employment were the category second least impacted by household budgets cuts. Last year, households still in employment were the second most likely to reduce spending. Significantly - households with some members on home duties, retired or not at work due to illness or disability posted the shallowest average cuts of all demographic groups.
The above explains why the data from multiples retailers in Ireland has been showing a V-shaped pattern of changes in consumer demand, with higher demand witnessed in lower-priced categories of own-brand goods supplied by discount retailers, such as Aldi and Lidl, and the premium own-brands of traditional multiples, such as Tesco. Demand for mid-range priced goods usually purchased by the middle class continued to fall.
Ditto for the luxury end of the market, with exception of Dublin, as sales of food and drink in specialist stores have fallen almost 20 percent on pre-crisis peak. Exactly the same pattern of shift away from the middle of price range sales emerged in the demand for electrical goods.
The drivers for the above trends are crystal clear. Middle Ireland is under severe pressures financially, while Happily-Retired and Yappy Irelands are having a relatively easy recession or living through the good times. The main force working through the Irish domestic demand is that of polarization of households not along the lines of employed v unemployed, but along the more complex and fragmented demographic lines.
The average number of spending cutbacks in 12 months through September 2012 for households with no person at work stood at 2.6 categories of spending. The same numbers for households with one and two persons working were 3.3 and 3.2 categories, respectively.
This pattern of cutbacks and income distribution changes across the households is also strengthening over time. In effect, due to Government policies, Ireland is becoming a country with severely polarised distribution of financial well-being. This polarisation is contrary to the one witnessed in normal economies and is different from the one that majority of out policymakers and analysts have been decrying to-date.
The Great Recession has finally exhausted ordinary savings of both working and unemployed households, while lack of income growth has meant that even those in employment are now sinking under the weight of debt and tax and cost inflation driven by the State budgetary policies to-date.
Last week, CSO reported distribution of the households by their ability to manage bills and debts over 12 months prior to July-September 2012. Of households with at least one adult aged 65 and over, up to 28 percent were experiencing difficulties in managing their debts and bills. For households with all adults under the age of 65 the corresponding number was up to 46 percent. Up to 69 percent of the families with children were in the same boat. The older the respondent was, the less pressure on paying their bills their reported.
In normal economies it is the older families that face tighter budget constraints. In today's Ireland it is the younger and the middle-age families with children that are being pressured the hardest by the crisis. This bedrock of financial health in the normal times has been pulled from underneath the economy by the Great Recession.
At the same time, the crisis has generated a new class of the relatively well-off. Based on employment levels and quality, earnings, as well as regular and irregular bonuses data, three sectors in the Irish economy stand out as the winners during the crisis: the ICT services, specialist exports-focused services and international financial services. All three sectors are dominated by younger workers with high percentage of employees coming from abroad and working on a temporary assignment basis here. The demographic they represent is primarily from mid-20s through mid-30s, with smaller size families. These groups of employees are also heavily concentrated geographically, with exporting services sectors workers primarily living in Dublin, followed by a handful of other core urban areas.
Even as early as 2006-2007, market research has shown that these types of households favour premium consumption of convenience food, spend more of their income on going out and travel abroad, and less on purchases of durable goods, household goods, education and health insurance. They do not invest in this economy and hold off-shore most of their long-term savings. Their financial investments are also held and managed abroad and often include mostly shares and options in their own employers. Their children are not going to continue growing up in Ireland and will not be a part of our future workforce. The skills they accumulate while working here are transitory to the overall stock of Irish human capital. On a social level, their demand for entertainment is currently best exemplified by the booming restaurants and bars across the D2-D4-D6 areas of Dublin and stands in stark contrast to Middle Ireland’s hollowed out town centres and neighborhoods with empty storefronts and vacant building sites.
Today’s Ireland is a society where the middle class and large swaths of the upper-middle class have been dragged under water by the combination of the unprecedented crisis, compounded by rampant state-sanctioned cost inflation and legacy debt.
The data on domestic demand suggests that we might be entering a classic ‘Bull trap’. Here, tight rental markets in the leafy South Dublin neighborhoods fuels sales of rentable properties to service the needs of the Yappy Ireland. These pockets of activity are at a risk of generating inflated expectations of incoming prosperity. Don’t be fooled by this – the risks to the real Irish economy are still there, in plain view, in the streets of real Ireland.
Recognising this reality requires the Government to reconsider the tax increases that are impacting adversely the middle and the upper-middle classes. It also means that the State must reform, rapidly and thoroughly the semi-state sector to reduce the cost drag exerted by the Irish utilities, transportation, health and education services providers on Middle Ireland families’ balancesheets. Lastly, prudent risk management requires for us to manage very carefully the process of mortgages arrears restructuring and debt work-outs. While many economy have survived sovereign and banking sectors busts, no economy can emerge from a crisis having destroyed its middle classes.
Box-out:
In Ptolemaic cosmology, astronomers believed that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. To balance this Universe, Ptolemists used to draw complex sets of larger and smaller circles - known as epicycles - to describes their orbits around the Earth. The problem with epicycles spelled the demise of the Ptolemaic cosmology in the end: as the known number of planets and stars increased, the system of superficial orbits rapidly collapsed under its own complexity. The Ptolemaic absurdity, however, is still alive today in Irish economic policies. A year ago, the Government had a clear choice of policy options: a site-value tax (SVT) that can be levied on all forms of properties, including land, or a residential property tax that can be levied only on structures. In a study covering all known forms of policy mechanisms used to fund public infrastructure around the world, submitted to the Department of Environment, I have argued that one of the major advantage of the SVT over a property tax was that it would have incentivised more efficient use land, reducing land hoarding and speculation. There were multiple other advantages of SVT over the property tax as well. Alas, the Government opted for a property tax favouring under-use of land over all other properties. This tax suits the major lobbies influencing the State: farmers and well-off rural landed families. Fast-forward eight months from last December: this week, Dublin City Council called for a levy on unused vacant sites. Hundreds of sites lay vacant across the city - blotching the cityscape and posing a threat to personal safety to many workers, as well as an unpleasant reminder of the property bust and economy's dysfunctionality to the would-be foreign investors. Dublin City has been trying to force this land back into development since 2009, although no one in the city has a slightest idea where the demand for such development might come from. Thus, our Ptolemaic system of economic policies is about to draw yet another contrived, complex and inefficient balancing circle on the map of our tax policies to compensate for the Government's rejection of the site value tax. After all, managing the superficial complexity of a political economy that attempts to appease the landed classes, while satisfying the needs and demands of foreign investors and urban authorities is an arduous task
Thursday, August 1, 2013
2/8/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: July 2013
Manufacturing PMI for Ireland was out yesterday. And as usual, it was worth waiting and giving the Irish media time to get through their circus of 'analysis'. The excitement of 'growth' predictions aside, here's the raw truth about the numbers (please, keep in mind that shambolic data coverage by Markit press-release is no longer conducive to any serious analysis of the underlying components of the PMIs). Note: PMI for Ireland are released by Investec and Markit.
All we have is the headline number. On the surface, headline Manufacturing PMI moved from 50.3 in June to 51.0 in July. Both numbers are above 50.0 and thus suggest expansion. This marks two consecutive months of growth.
However, there are some serious problems with the above. Read on:
-- At 51.0, July PMI is barely above 12 mo average of 50.7.
-- 3mo average through July is at 50.3, ahead of 49.4 3mo average through April 2013 - which is good news.
-- In July 2012, PMI was at 53.9 which was statistically significantly above 50.0 (in other words, statistically we did have growth in July 2012, which turned out to be pretty disastrous year for manufacturing and industry as we know). And in July 2013 at 51.0 there is no statistically significant difference in current PMI reading from 50.0, which means - statistically-speaking - we do not have growth.
-- Current 3mo MA at 50.3 is not different from 50.0 statistically
-- Current 3mo MA is below that in 2012 (52.7), ahead of that in 2011 (49.9) and below that for 2010 (52.4) - which is not exactly confidence-inspiring, right?
-- M/m (recall, these are seasonally-adjusted numbers) there was a rise in PMI of 0.7 (slightly better than m/m rise of 0.6 in June 2013). Alas, this monthly rise was also statistically indifferent from zero.
Here are two charts that illustrate the above points.
In short - good news is that PMI is reading above 50 and strengthened in July compared to June. Bad news is that statistically-speaking, neither the reading levels (in both June and July), nor increases m/m (in both June or July) are significant. Which means that we simply cannot will away the caution in reading the PMI numbers this time around.
Any source
All we have is the headline number. On the surface, headline Manufacturing PMI moved from 50.3 in June to 51.0 in July. Both numbers are above 50.0 and thus suggest expansion. This marks two consecutive months of growth.
However, there are some serious problems with the above. Read on:
-- At 51.0, July PMI is barely above 12 mo average of 50.7.
-- 3mo average through July is at 50.3, ahead of 49.4 3mo average through April 2013 - which is good news.
-- In July 2012, PMI was at 53.9 which was statistically significantly above 50.0 (in other words, statistically we did have growth in July 2012, which turned out to be pretty disastrous year for manufacturing and industry as we know). And in July 2013 at 51.0 there is no statistically significant difference in current PMI reading from 50.0, which means - statistically-speaking - we do not have growth.
-- Current 3mo MA at 50.3 is not different from 50.0 statistically
-- Current 3mo MA is below that in 2012 (52.7), ahead of that in 2011 (49.9) and below that for 2010 (52.4) - which is not exactly confidence-inspiring, right?
-- M/m (recall, these are seasonally-adjusted numbers) there was a rise in PMI of 0.7 (slightly better than m/m rise of 0.6 in June 2013). Alas, this monthly rise was also statistically indifferent from zero.
Here are two charts that illustrate the above points.
In short - good news is that PMI is reading above 50 and strengthened in July compared to June. Bad news is that statistically-speaking, neither the reading levels (in both June and July), nor increases m/m (in both June or July) are significant. Which means that we simply cannot will away the caution in reading the PMI numbers this time around.
Thursday, July 25, 2013
25/7/2013: BlackRock Institute latest survey results for global economic outlook: June 2013
The latest summary of the global growth conditions from the BlackRock Investment Institute. Click on the chart to open larger version. I have highlighted Ireland on the chart.
Blue bars reflect consensus on current phase of economic development (for example, in Ireland's case, current phase is seen as being recessionary by roughly 25% of respondents to the survey). Red dot corresponds to 6mo forward expectation (in Ireland's case, 50% of respondents expect recession in Ireland to either continue or to present itself again in 6 months time).
Note: this is the view of surveyed economists and not the view of the BlackRock II. The chart is based on the "trailing 3 survey reports for the other regions we poll. In our first month of this initiative, we collected the views of over 430 economists from more than 200 institutions, spanning over 50 countries"
Any source
Blue bars reflect consensus on current phase of economic development (for example, in Ireland's case, current phase is seen as being recessionary by roughly 25% of respondents to the survey). Red dot corresponds to 6mo forward expectation (in Ireland's case, 50% of respondents expect recession in Ireland to either continue or to present itself again in 6 months time).
Note: this is the view of surveyed economists and not the view of the BlackRock II. The chart is based on the "trailing 3 survey reports for the other regions we poll. In our first month of this initiative, we collected the views of over 430 economists from more than 200 institutions, spanning over 50 countries"
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Tuesday, July 23, 2013
23/7/2013: Ireland is not Greece... and never was...
Resting on one's laurels is a dodgy proposition. However, forgetting one's achievements is of an equally problematic virtue. To balance things up - a good reminder of Ireland's road travelled from the 1960s through 2008 and I have adjusted figures for Greece and Ireland for 2012 levels of GDP per capita based on IMF data.
Source: the original from World Bank, 2012.
Interesting bit - Ireland remains in the 'rich' club as a country that managed an elusive move from middle income economy in the 1960s to high income economy in 2000s and 2010s. Greece dropped out of the same group.
Any source
Source: the original from World Bank, 2012.
Interesting bit - Ireland remains in the 'rich' club as a country that managed an elusive move from middle income economy in the 1960s to high income economy in 2000s and 2010s. Greece dropped out of the same group.
Friday, July 19, 2013
19/7/2013: Reuters TV on Irish Economy & Bankruptcy Tourism
Two recent Reuters TV programmes on
Note: both programmes feature my contributions.
Any source
- Irish Bankruptcy Tourism http://www.reuters.com/video/2013/07/15/is-holiday-over-for-bankruptcy-tourists?videoId=244230864 and
- Whether Ireland is on the Road to Recovery http://www.reuters.com/video/2013/07/12/is-ireland-really-on-road-to-recovery?videoId=244195065&videoChannel=5
Note: both programmes feature my contributions.
Saturday, July 13, 2013
13/7/2013: Reuters on Anglo Tapes & Social Awakening in Ireland
Reuters programme on Ireland awakening to the banking and economic mess. Warning: shameless self-promotion (my contributions included).
http://uk.reuters.com/article/video/idUKBRE96B0X620130712?videoId=244195065
Friday, July 12, 2013
12/7/2013: IMF Report on Malta: A Warning for Ireland
IMF Report on Malta is out, with, as expected, much of attention given to the risks of erosion of the tax advantages that form one of the core drivers for Malta's growth. This, of course, is of interest to other European jurisdictions, including Ireland.
IMF opens the report with a statement that Malta (emphasis in italics is mine) "has maintained macroeconomic stability in the face of a major crisis in Europe. Low reliance on external finance by the government and domestic banks, solid fundamentals, and a sound banking system have contributed to this resilience. However, recent events in Europe have heightened financial stability risks. In the longer term, Malta’s attractiveness as a financial and business location could be adversely affected by regulatory and tax reforms at the European level. "
"The Maltese economy has greatly benefitted from a business-friendly tax regime… Although these gains are hard to quantify, the large increase experienced in financial services [parallels to our IFSC anyone?] and other niche activities [in Malta's case: online gambling. In Ireland's: all IP-linked tax arbitrage, e.g. Google et al] since 2004 are likely related to Malta’s accession to the EU [which means Ireland is hardly unique here], its macroeconomic stability [which Ireland spectacularly does not have], and relatively favorable tax regime [bingo!]. Over the last ten years, more than half of the growth in value added is explained by the growth in financial services, ancillary activities (legal, accounting, and consulting), remote gaming, and ICT [wait, wait… but Dublin?… replace remote gaming with pharma - worse]. These sectors alone account for a quarter of total value added and 12 percent of employment [err… even more in Ireland and growing, again - replace remote gaming with gaming and… worse in the case of Ireland]. It is possible that greater fiscal integration of EU member states and a potential harmonization of tax rates could erode some of these benefits, with consequences on employment, output and fiscal revenues."
The risk is medium in size, medium/low in probability of materialisation and medium term - per IMF:
And thus, the report states that "The authorities were also of the view that an EU-wide tax harmonization would not happen in the short or medium term." However, let me ask you a simple question - how often does the IMF directly and bluntly pointing actual risks to the euro area states? After they have fully materialised, only. Hence, IMF stating the politically-sensitive and structurally important risk is 'medium/low' in likelihood and 'medium' in expected impact is as stern of a warning as one might expect. At any rate, of 6 main risks faced by the Maltese economy, the risk of tax regime changes is ranked joint 3rd with the risk of Protracted period of slower European growth, Significant declines in real estate prices, and ahead of the risk of Global oil shock triggered by geopolitical events.
Why such downplaying of the risks?
"Malta has been an important international banking centre in the past 25 years. A special offshore regime for banks (and other non-bank institutions) was promoted since the late
1980s. Like in several other European jurisdictions (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, or Switzerland), the main incentives offered to foreign investors at that time included exemptions from various regulations imposed on onshore banks and a favorable fiscal treatment."
How bad?
"The separate offshore supervisory framework was eliminated in 2002. As part of the planned accession into the EU, Malta was required to amend its financial policies to treat local businesses the same as international companies. In the mid-1990s, Malta started abolishing its offshore banking. In 2002, the legal amendments to the Banking Law removed an offshore banking option. Since then, all banks operate under the same regulatory and fiscal frameworks."
Spotting a picture of Dublin's IFSC, yet?..
"However, Malta maintained a substantial tax incentive for attracting foreign investors
in its banking and other businesses. This was achieved through tax refunds based on the
dividends that a local bank distributes to its shareholders. While the headline corporate income tax rate in Malta is 35 percent, the application of a tax refund system positions Malta as the country with one of the lowest effective tax in the EU, which ranges between 0 and 12 percent. The quantum of the tax refund depends on the nature of income and is generally equal to 6/7th of the underlying tax (35 percent), resulting in a 30 percent tax refund of the taxable profits."
Of course, Ireland does not provide such refunds - instead we have a Mega 'Refund' System called Double-Irish.
"In addition, the EU accession in 2004 and the euro adoption in 2008 boosted international banking and non-bank financial sector activities in Malta. Several large banking groups from various countries around the world (Australia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, etc) established their presence in Malta since the mid-2000s. The EU and euro area memberships inspired confidence; the former also allowed non-EU investors an easy access to European markets, while the latter facilitated transactions for EU-based investors. The availability of skilled people and the use of English as the official language also contributed to making Malta an attractive place for doing business by the multinational banks."
You have to laugh reading the above, as you can just replace Malta with Ireland there and nail the regular IDA presentations…
"As a result, the internationally-active banks have become large compared to the size
of the Maltese economy. As of October 2012, there were 13 non-core domestic banks and
8 international banks, with assets of respectively €5.3 billion (80 percent of GDP) and €33.1 billion (500 percent of GDP). The majority of these banks are subsidiaries of EU banks offering a range of services to non-residents that include trade finance, investment banking, and group funding operations."
"Unlike some other EU countries with a big international financial centre (for example,
Cyprus or Ireland), Malta has not experienced any deleveraging pressures in recent years. As a result, measured by the total bank assets to GDP ratio, Malta now ranks higher than Cyprus or Ireland, and is second only to Luxembourg among all EU countries."
Problem, Roger, is that the above statement is pretty much bonkers. Ireland has deleveraged not tax-sensitive international banking sector, but tax incentives-insensitive domestic sector. Cyprus 'deleveraged' deposits. So from the truth-in-analysis point of view, one should look at the compatible assets and liabilities at risk of tax regime changes. And that is much harder, as a large part of Irish internal assets and liabilities is really IFSC, while part of Malta's external assets and liabilities is domestic economy.
All in - the risk is real. This is why IMF (having downplayed it to medium) still posits it as the fifth most significant in overall terms.
Ireland should be seriously concerned.
Note: I wrote about the threats to Ireland from tax policy harmonisation most recently here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/07/272013-sunday-times-june-23-2013-g8-and.html
And I wrote about Malta's tax dilemma and IMF analysis of it before, here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/05/1552013-what-imf-assessment-of-malta.html
Any source
IMF opens the report with a statement that Malta (emphasis in italics is mine) "has maintained macroeconomic stability in the face of a major crisis in Europe. Low reliance on external finance by the government and domestic banks, solid fundamentals, and a sound banking system have contributed to this resilience. However, recent events in Europe have heightened financial stability risks. In the longer term, Malta’s attractiveness as a financial and business location could be adversely affected by regulatory and tax reforms at the European level. "
"The Maltese economy has greatly benefitted from a business-friendly tax regime… Although these gains are hard to quantify, the large increase experienced in financial services [parallels to our IFSC anyone?] and other niche activities [in Malta's case: online gambling. In Ireland's: all IP-linked tax arbitrage, e.g. Google et al] since 2004 are likely related to Malta’s accession to the EU [which means Ireland is hardly unique here], its macroeconomic stability [which Ireland spectacularly does not have], and relatively favorable tax regime [bingo!]. Over the last ten years, more than half of the growth in value added is explained by the growth in financial services, ancillary activities (legal, accounting, and consulting), remote gaming, and ICT [wait, wait… but Dublin?… replace remote gaming with pharma - worse]. These sectors alone account for a quarter of total value added and 12 percent of employment [err… even more in Ireland and growing, again - replace remote gaming with gaming and… worse in the case of Ireland]. It is possible that greater fiscal integration of EU member states and a potential harmonization of tax rates could erode some of these benefits, with consequences on employment, output and fiscal revenues."
The risk is medium in size, medium/low in probability of materialisation and medium term - per IMF:
And thus, the report states that "The authorities were also of the view that an EU-wide tax harmonization would not happen in the short or medium term." However, let me ask you a simple question - how often does the IMF directly and bluntly pointing actual risks to the euro area states? After they have fully materialised, only. Hence, IMF stating the politically-sensitive and structurally important risk is 'medium/low' in likelihood and 'medium' in expected impact is as stern of a warning as one might expect. At any rate, of 6 main risks faced by the Maltese economy, the risk of tax regime changes is ranked joint 3rd with the risk of Protracted period of slower European growth, Significant declines in real estate prices, and ahead of the risk of Global oil shock triggered by geopolitical events.
Why such downplaying of the risks?
"Malta has been an important international banking centre in the past 25 years. A special offshore regime for banks (and other non-bank institutions) was promoted since the late
1980s. Like in several other European jurisdictions (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, or Switzerland), the main incentives offered to foreign investors at that time included exemptions from various regulations imposed on onshore banks and a favorable fiscal treatment."
How bad?
"The separate offshore supervisory framework was eliminated in 2002. As part of the planned accession into the EU, Malta was required to amend its financial policies to treat local businesses the same as international companies. In the mid-1990s, Malta started abolishing its offshore banking. In 2002, the legal amendments to the Banking Law removed an offshore banking option. Since then, all banks operate under the same regulatory and fiscal frameworks."
Spotting a picture of Dublin's IFSC, yet?..
"However, Malta maintained a substantial tax incentive for attracting foreign investors
in its banking and other businesses. This was achieved through tax refunds based on the
dividends that a local bank distributes to its shareholders. While the headline corporate income tax rate in Malta is 35 percent, the application of a tax refund system positions Malta as the country with one of the lowest effective tax in the EU, which ranges between 0 and 12 percent. The quantum of the tax refund depends on the nature of income and is generally equal to 6/7th of the underlying tax (35 percent), resulting in a 30 percent tax refund of the taxable profits."
Of course, Ireland does not provide such refunds - instead we have a Mega 'Refund' System called Double-Irish.
"In addition, the EU accession in 2004 and the euro adoption in 2008 boosted international banking and non-bank financial sector activities in Malta. Several large banking groups from various countries around the world (Australia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, etc) established their presence in Malta since the mid-2000s. The EU and euro area memberships inspired confidence; the former also allowed non-EU investors an easy access to European markets, while the latter facilitated transactions for EU-based investors. The availability of skilled people and the use of English as the official language also contributed to making Malta an attractive place for doing business by the multinational banks."
You have to laugh reading the above, as you can just replace Malta with Ireland there and nail the regular IDA presentations…
"As a result, the internationally-active banks have become large compared to the size
of the Maltese economy. As of October 2012, there were 13 non-core domestic banks and
8 international banks, with assets of respectively €5.3 billion (80 percent of GDP) and €33.1 billion (500 percent of GDP). The majority of these banks are subsidiaries of EU banks offering a range of services to non-residents that include trade finance, investment banking, and group funding operations."
"Unlike some other EU countries with a big international financial centre (for example,
Cyprus or Ireland), Malta has not experienced any deleveraging pressures in recent years. As a result, measured by the total bank assets to GDP ratio, Malta now ranks higher than Cyprus or Ireland, and is second only to Luxembourg among all EU countries."
Problem, Roger, is that the above statement is pretty much bonkers. Ireland has deleveraged not tax-sensitive international banking sector, but tax incentives-insensitive domestic sector. Cyprus 'deleveraged' deposits. So from the truth-in-analysis point of view, one should look at the compatible assets and liabilities at risk of tax regime changes. And that is much harder, as a large part of Irish internal assets and liabilities is really IFSC, while part of Malta's external assets and liabilities is domestic economy.
All in - the risk is real. This is why IMF (having downplayed it to medium) still posits it as the fifth most significant in overall terms.
Ireland should be seriously concerned.
Note: I wrote about the threats to Ireland from tax policy harmonisation most recently here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/07/272013-sunday-times-june-23-2013-g8-and.html
And I wrote about Malta's tax dilemma and IMF analysis of it before, here: http://www.fergco.co/2013/05/1552013-what-imf-assessment-of-malta.html
Thursday, July 11, 2013
11/7/2013: Consumer Confidence Boost in June
ESRI/KBC Consumer Confidence indicator for Ireland posted a surprising jump in June compared to May, rising to 70.6 from 61.2. The index is now at the highest reading since October 2007. There are many caveats to this increase, as contained in the ESRI/KBC release, available here:
http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy/consumer_sentiment/latest_consumer_sentiment/PRJune_13.pdf
The chart below plots June reading for the indicator (vertical red line), as well as the latest (May 2013) pairings of Consumer Confidence against Volume and Value indices of retail sales (labeled as 'Current').
The chart below puts the time series for retail sales (through May) and Consumer Confidence (thorugh June):
The core points to add to the release (linked above) is that
This is not to criticise the Consumer Confidence Indicator quality, but to caution against any short-term calls to be based on indicator alone. To see serious change in the underlying consumer propensity to spend and to see any serious change in the underlying inputs into the national accounts, we have to wait for a confirmation over time of the stronger trend in all three series.
Any source
http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy/consumer_sentiment/latest_consumer_sentiment/PRJune_13.pdf
The chart below plots June reading for the indicator (vertical red line), as well as the latest (May 2013) pairings of Consumer Confidence against Volume and Value indices of retail sales (labeled as 'Current').
The chart below puts the time series for retail sales (through May) and Consumer Confidence (thorugh June):
The core points to add to the release (linked above) is that
- Consumer Confidence has little direct connection to core (ex-motors) retail sales indices, with low R-squares for both relationships.
- Consumer Confidence shows more volatility than the volume of retail sales across all time periods. Pre-January 2008, STDEV for Value of Retail Sales is at 7.0 and for Volume at 6.6, with Consumer Confidence at 14.8. Since January 2008, Consumer Confidence STDEV is at 7.9, against 4.5 for Volume and 7.4 for Value of core retail sales. Since January 2010, STDEV to Consumer Confidence is at 6.3, against that for Value of retail sales at 1.3 and Volume of 1.8.
- Last chart above clearly shows divergent trends in retail sales and confidence series from July 2008 through June 2010 and from March 2011 through today.
This is not to criticise the Consumer Confidence Indicator quality, but to caution against any short-term calls to be based on indicator alone. To see serious change in the underlying consumer propensity to spend and to see any serious change in the underlying inputs into the national accounts, we have to wait for a confirmation over time of the stronger trend in all three series.
Sunday, July 7, 2013
7/72013: Irish Manufacturing & Services PMI: June 2013
In the previous post I covered in detail the dynamics of the Services PMI (here) and few posts back, I covered Manufacturing PMIs (here). Now, lets take a look at both together.
Chart above shows the deviations of both PMIs from 50.0, with pre-crisis and post-crisis averages.
The relative weakness in Manufacturing performance, from the end of Q2 2011 through current is pretty much apparent. Both, manufacturing and services PMIs signaled much stronger growth conditions prior to the crisis, than since the beginning of 2010.
The most significant decline took place in Services, with the pre-crisis average deviation from 50.0 at 7.6 falling to 1.9 average deviation in post-January 2010 period. With STDEV at 6.5 since 2008 (7.4 prior historical), and with skew at -0.7 and kurtosis at 0.73, we are nowhere near average deviation being statistically significantly different from zero since the onset of 'recovery'.
Manufacturing decline has been more modest, given weak rates of growth in pre-crisis period. The average rate of pre-crisis deviation from 50 was 2.6 and that well to 1.1. With historical STDEV of 4.2 and STDEV since 2008 at 5.2, skew at -1.6 and kurtosis of 3.24, this is again indistinguishable from zero growth conditions.
On slightly better side of things and along shorter-run dimension, 3mo MAs are both above zero, but, once again, none are statistically significantly different from zero.
There is a strong, but non-linear relationship between Manufacturing and Services PMIs at levels, and it shows that year on year, relative gains in Manufacturing over 2011-2012 got erased over 2012-2013 and were replaced by relative gains in Services.
Irish PMIs have, however, very tenuous link to actual economic growth. Here are two charts showing this week relationship for log-log growth terms, but exactly the same picture is confirmed by taking simple level deviations in PMIs from 50, as well as for linear and cubic relationships (for robustness):
It is quite telling that Services PMIs have much weaker explanatory power for GDP and GNP growth than Manufacturing PMIs, confirming that Irish services, dominated by ICT and IFSC tax-optimising MNCs are not as relevant to Irish economy as manufacturing sectors.
Another telling thing is that both for Services and Manufacturing, the sectors activity as measured by PMIs has stronger relationship with GDP than GNP - which is also predictable, once you consider the PMIs heavy slant toward MNCs.
Note: raw data on PMIs levels is taken from Markit-Investec releases, with all analysis above, as well as deviations from 50 and all other transformations, including quarterly data computations, undertaken by myself. These transformations and analysis are intellectual property of my own and should not be cited without appropriate attribution.
Any source
The relative weakness in Manufacturing performance, from the end of Q2 2011 through current is pretty much apparent. Both, manufacturing and services PMIs signaled much stronger growth conditions prior to the crisis, than since the beginning of 2010.
The most significant decline took place in Services, with the pre-crisis average deviation from 50.0 at 7.6 falling to 1.9 average deviation in post-January 2010 period. With STDEV at 6.5 since 2008 (7.4 prior historical), and with skew at -0.7 and kurtosis at 0.73, we are nowhere near average deviation being statistically significantly different from zero since the onset of 'recovery'.
Manufacturing decline has been more modest, given weak rates of growth in pre-crisis period. The average rate of pre-crisis deviation from 50 was 2.6 and that well to 1.1. With historical STDEV of 4.2 and STDEV since 2008 at 5.2, skew at -1.6 and kurtosis of 3.24, this is again indistinguishable from zero growth conditions.
On slightly better side of things and along shorter-run dimension, 3mo MAs are both above zero, but, once again, none are statistically significantly different from zero.
There is a strong, but non-linear relationship between Manufacturing and Services PMIs at levels, and it shows that year on year, relative gains in Manufacturing over 2011-2012 got erased over 2012-2013 and were replaced by relative gains in Services.
Irish PMIs have, however, very tenuous link to actual economic growth. Here are two charts showing this week relationship for log-log growth terms, but exactly the same picture is confirmed by taking simple level deviations in PMIs from 50, as well as for linear and cubic relationships (for robustness):
It is quite telling that Services PMIs have much weaker explanatory power for GDP and GNP growth than Manufacturing PMIs, confirming that Irish services, dominated by ICT and IFSC tax-optimising MNCs are not as relevant to Irish economy as manufacturing sectors.
Another telling thing is that both for Services and Manufacturing, the sectors activity as measured by PMIs has stronger relationship with GDP than GNP - which is also predictable, once you consider the PMIs heavy slant toward MNCs.
Note: raw data on PMIs levels is taken from Markit-Investec releases, with all analysis above, as well as deviations from 50 and all other transformations, including quarterly data computations, undertaken by myself. These transformations and analysis are intellectual property of my own and should not be cited without appropriate attribution.
Thursday, July 4, 2013
4/7/2013: Blackrock Institute Surveys: North America, Europe and EMEA: June 2013
Two charts showing most recent consensus expectations on North American, Western European and EMEA economies from the Blackrock Investment Institute panel of economists (note: these do not represent views of Blackrock).
Notice clustering of peripherals and France, as opposed to marginally better clustering of the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Eurozone.
Note Ukraine as the sick man of the region. Also note Slovenia and Croatia - two EU economies that are significantly under-performing the regional grouping.
Any source
Notice clustering of peripherals and France, as opposed to marginally better clustering of the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Eurozone.
Note Ukraine as the sick man of the region. Also note Slovenia and Croatia - two EU economies that are significantly under-performing the regional grouping.
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