Showing posts with label Irish Exports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish Exports. Show all posts

Sunday, October 6, 2013

7/10/2013: Taking an Easy Road Out of Budget 2014? Sunday Times, September 22

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from September 22, 2013.


The upcoming Budget 2014 will be one of the toughest since the beginning of the crisis in terms of the overall levels of cuts and tax increases. It also promises to cut across the psychological barrier of austerity fatigue. The latter aspect of Budget 2014 is more pernicious. Two other factors will add to the national distress, comes October 15th. Reinforcing our national sense of exhaustion with endless austerity, this week, the IMF published a staff research paper on fiscal adjustments undertaken during the current Great Recession. According to some, the IMF study reinforces the argument that Ireland should have been allowed to spread the austerity over a longer period time. In addition to this, Ireland’s planned 2014 cuts are set to be well in excess of the deficit reduction targets for any other euro area country.

The superficial reading of the IMF statement, the nascent sense of social distress brewing underneath the surface of public calm, and the tangible and very real pain felt by many in the society suggest that the Government should take it easier in 2014-2015. The policy option, consistent with such a choice would be to cut less than committed to under the multi-annual fiscal plans agreed with the Troika. This is being proposed by a number of senior Ministers and TDs, the Opposition and the Unions.

Alas, Ministers Noonan and Howlin have little choice when it comes to the actual volumes of fiscal adjustments they will have to implement next year. Like it or not, we will need to stick very close to the EUR3.1 billion deficit reduction targets irrespective of the IMF working papers conclusions, or the volume of outcries coming from the Government backbenchers and the opposition ranks.

Here's how the brutal logic of our budgetary position stacks up against an idea of easing on deficit reductions.

If everything goes according to the plan, Ireland will end 2013 with a second or a third highest deficit in the EU, depending on how we account for the one-off spending measures across the peripheral states. We will also have the second highest primary deficit (that is deficit excluding cost of interest payments on Government debt) in the euro area. In 2014 this abysmal performance will replay once again, assuming we meet the targets. Greece and Italy are set to finish 2013 with a primary surplus. Portugal is expected to post a primary deficit of less than one half that of Ireland's. Should Ireland deliver on the targets for 2014, our gap between the Government revenues and spending will still stand at around 4.3-4.6 percent of GDP at the end of December 2014. Not a great position to be in, especially for a country that claims to be different from the rest of the euro periphery.

In this environment, talking about any change in the course on austerity or attempting to enact a fiscal stimulus will be equivalent to accelerating into a blind corner on a one-lane road.

In order to stabilise government debt, Ireland will require cumulative deficits cuts of 11.6% of GDP between January 2013 and December 2018 with quarter of these cuts scheduled for 2014-2015. This is the largest volume of cuts for any economy in the euro area - more than 20 percent greater than the one to be undertaken by Greece and more than 50 percent in excess of Spain’s requirement.

Any delay in cuts today will only multiply pain tomorrow with higher debt to deflate in 2016-2018. As things stand under the agreed plans, Ireland will be spending 4.9 percent of its GDP annually on funding debt interest payments from through 2018. This is more than one and a half times greater than what we will be allocating to gross public investment. The interest bill, over the next five years, will be at least EUR46 billion. Lowering 2014 adjustment target by EUR1 billion can result in the above cost rising to over EUR50 billion, based on my estimates using the IMF forecast models.

The reason for this is that any departure from the committed fiscal adjustment path is likely to have consequences.

Firstly, with the ongoing sell-offs of bonds in the global investment markets, it is highly likely that the cost of funding Government debt for Ireland will rise over the medium term even absent any delays in fiscal adjustments. The long-term interest rates are already showing sharper rising of yields on longer maturity bonds compared to short-dated bonds. Year to date, German 10-year yields are up 64 basis points, UK are up 105 bps and the US ones are up 111 bps. The effects of these changes on Irish debt and deficit dynamics are not yet fully priced in the latest IMF forecasts. A mild steepening of the maturity curve for Ireland can significantly increase our interest bill. This risk becomes even more pronounced if we are to delay the Troika programme.

Secondly, failure to fulfill our commitments is unlikely to help us in our transition from Troika funding. Ireland will require a precautionary standby arrangement of at least EUR10 billion in cheaply priced funds. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds to cover this come on foot of good will of our EU 'partners'. These partners, in turn, are seeking to redraft EU tax policies, as well as banking, financial and ICT services regulations. In virtually all of these proposals, Ireland is at odds with the European consensus. Good will of Paris and Berlin is a hard commodity, requiring hard currency of appeasement. Whether we like it or not, by stepping into the euro system, we committed ourselves to this position.

The long run financial arithmetic also presents a major problem for those who misread the latest IMF research on austerity as a sign that the Fund is advocating easing of the 2014-2015 adjustments for Ireland. The IMF clearly shows that Ireland has already delayed required fiscal cuts more than any other euro area economy. In all euro area peripheral economies, other than Ireland, fiscal adjustments for 2014-2015 are set at less than one fifth of the total adjustment required for 2010-2015 period. In Ireland they are set at one third. Which means that, having taken more medicine upfront, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Iceland can now afford to ease on cutting future primary imbalances.


With this in mind, there is not a snowballs chance in hell that we can substantively deviate from the plan to cut EUR3.1 billion, gross, from 2014 deficit without facing steep bill for doing so. Which leaves us with the only pertinent question to be asked: how such an adjustment should be spread across three areas of fiscal policy: Government revenues, current expenditure and capital expenditure.

This year, through August, Government finances have been running ahead of both 2012 levels and we are perfuming well relative to what was planned in the budget 2013 profile. However, the headline numbers conceal some worrying sub-currents.

This year's current primary expenditure in 8 months through August stood at over EUR36.6 billion, more than targeted in the 2013 profile and ahead on the same period last year. This deterioration was caused by the one off payment made on winding down the IBRC, plus the increase in contributions to the EU budget. Nonetheless, while tax and Government revenues increases in the 8 moths of 2013 were running at almost EUR3.4 billion compared to the same period of 2012, spending reductions are down only EUR823 million.

To-date, only 17 percent of the entire annual adjustment came via current voted spending cuts and over 57 percent came from increases in Government revenues. The balance of savings was achieved by slashing further already decimated capital investment programmes.  Given the overall capital investment profile from 1994 through forecast 2013 levels, as provided by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, this year's net capital spending is likely to come below the amount required to cover amortisation and depreciation of the current stock of Government capital. Put simply, we are just about keeping the windows on our public buildings and doors on our public schools in working order.

In this environment, Labour Party and opposition calls for undoing 'the savage cuts to our frontline services' - or current spending side of the Government balance sheet - are about as good as Doctor Nick Rivera's cheerfully internecine surgical exploits in the Simpsons.

The adjustments to be taken over the next two years will have to fall heavily on current spending side. This is a very painful task. To-date, much of the savings achieved on the expenditure side involved either transforming public spending into private sector fees, which can be called a hidden form of taxation, or by achieving short term temporary savings.

The former is best exemplified by continued hikes of hospitals' charges which have all but decimated the markets for health insurance. The result is a simultaneous reduction in health insurance coverage, an increase in demand for public health services and costly emergency treatments. The 'savings' achieved are most likely costing us more than they bring in.

The latter is exemplified by temporary pay moderation agreements and staff reductions in the public sector. This presents a problem to be faced comes 2015-2016: with growth picking up, many savings delivered by staff reductions and pay moderation measures will be the first to be reversed under the pressure from the unions.

In short, the Government has no choice, but to largely follow the prescribed course of action. Like it or not, it also has no choice but to cut deeper into current spending. This is going to be an ugly budget by all measures possible, but the real cause of the pain it will inflict rests not with the Troika insistence on austerity. Instead, the real drivers for Ireland’s deep cuts in public spending are the internal imbalances in our public expenditure and the lack of deeper reforms in the earlier years of the crisis.


Via @IMF

Box-out: 

Recent data from the CSO on Irish goods exports painted a picture of significant gains in one indigenous economy sector: agri-food exports. The exports of Food and live animals increased by EUR101 million or 15 percent in July 2013, compared to July 2012. In seven months from January 2013, agri-food exports rose to EUR4,911 million, up 8.8 percent. Most of the increases related to exports of animals-related products, live animals, eggs and milk. The new data caused a small avalanche of press releases from various representative bodies extolling the virtues of agri-food sector in Ireland and posting claims that the sector is poised to drive Ireland out of the recession. Alas, the data on agricultural prices, also covering the period through July 2013, released just three days after the publication of exports statistics, poured some cold water over the hot coals of agri-food sector egos. From January through July 2013, the main driver for improved exports performance of our agriculture and food sectors was not some indigenous productivity growth or innovation, but the price inflation in the globally-set agricultural output prices. On an annual basis, the agricultural output prices rose 10.7 percent in July 2013. Over the same period of time, the agricultural input price index was up 5.2 percent in July 2013. This means that Irish exports uptick in 2013 to-date was built on the pain of consumers elsewhere. So good news is that our agri-food exports were up. Bad news is that we have preciously little, if anything, to do with causing this rise.

Any source

Monday, September 16, 2013

16/9/2013: Don't chill that champagne, yet... Irish Agri-food Exports

Here's one of the core reasons as to why agricultural exports are booming in Ireland:


Or more precisely, implied profit margins on sales:

So in basic terms: global food inflation is driving Ireland's agri-food exports since ca Q1 2010, while profitability improvements are contributing to the same since ca Q4 2011. The former is obviously not due to our competitiveness gains or efficiency improvements or great business strategies or policies. The latter is, err... not that much either, as costs continued to inflate since Q4 2011, albeit slower than output prices. In other words, our improved profit margin in the agri-food sector are also due to someone, somewhere on the Planet having to pay more for food.
Any source

Thursday, August 15, 2013

16/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods & Balance Dynamics for Ireland

On foot of my post detailing Irish cumulated figures for trade in goods for H1 2013, some asked me to post on the relationship between exports and trade balance. Here are few charts, taking snapshot from H12000 through H1 2013:

First, two charts showing levels of exports and trade balance for trade in goods:



Note that in the first chart, there is barely any difference between the 2000-2013 average level of exports (at EUR44.145bn) and 2009-2013 period average (at EUR45.077bn). The gap is only 2.1% of EUR932mln. At the same time, the second chart shows that there is a massive gap between the average trade balance over the period of 2000-2013 (EUR17.184bn) and for the period of 2009-2013 (EUR20.728bn) -  a gap of 20.6% or EUR3,544 mln. The core reason for this is that much of the 2009-2013 'stellar' performance in our trade surplus was driven by collapse in imports, rather than a rise in exports. 

To see this, let us plot exports against trade balance:


The last chart clearly shows that in 2009-2013, on average, exports were tracking changes in trade balance, but they were not doing so 1:1.

More interestingly, the chart shows that trade in goods in Ireland is in trouble. In 2009-2013 period, Irish Government policy has been to rely solely on exports (of goods and services) in driving the economy toward recovery and debt sustainability. This hope rests on growth in exports and simultaneously positive trade balance and growing trade balance as the key parameters for consideration when it comes to both economic growth and debt sustainability.

Alas, in years 2010, 2012 and 2013 (in other words in 3 out of 5 years), measured by H1 figures alone, Irish goods traded operated in the 'pain spot' region - the region of shrinking exports and shrinking trade surpluses.

In other words, in terms of levels our merchandise trade is performing well. But in terms of growth it is performing poorly. And this is despite a huge drop-off in imports, something that is not likely to last when the economy goes back to capital investment (imports of capital goods will rise) and/or consumption recovery (imports of consumption goods will rise).
Any source

15/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods data for Ireland


Latest data for Merchandise trade for June 2013 allows us to make some comparatives for the first half of the year. Here are some stats, all covering only merchandise trade:

  • Total Imports rose in H1 2013 by 3.12% on H2 2012 and were down 2.39% on H1 2012. Imports were up 3.11% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of imports were 23.2 below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Total Exports fell in H1 2013 by 4.35% on H2 2012 and were down 6.55% on H1 2012. Exports declined, in absolute terms by EUR3.045 billion year-on-year. This marked the largest 6-mo cumulative drop in exports since H1 2003, marking the H1 2013 the worst year-on-year 6 months period since then.
  • Exports were down 4.48% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of exports were 12.43% below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Trade Surplus fell 12.62% on H2 2012 and was down 11.47% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012. In level terms, trade surplus was down EUR2.442 billion in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, marking the worst 6 months period since H1 2005.
Charts below illustrate the trends:


Good news, per chart above, Trade Surplus is still running above 2000-present average, although Exports are now running below their 2000-present average. Bad news, the above chart does not adjust for inflation.

Not-too-good news is, exports are now in the negative territory in terms of y/y changes. Remember, we need positive growth in total (merchandise and services) exports of ca 5% per annum to maintain any semblance of sustainability. Here's the tricky bit:


As chart above shows, we really need rapid, very rapid growth in services exports to return our total exports and trade balance to where we need them to be to maintain economic activity at the levels that will be consistent with long-term gradual reduction of public debt.  Over the last 5 years, merchandise exports in Ireland grew on average at 0.59% y/y and over the last 10 years this growth was 0.94%. Owing to the recent collapse in our imports, our trade balance grew on average at 11.73% in the last 5 years. However, over the last 10 years the growth in our trade balance was much less dramatic 3.18%.
Any source

Friday, August 9, 2013

9/8/2013: Irish ICT Services: Geniuses & Jobs Creators?..

The latest annual services inquiry for Ireland, published yesterday by the CSO and available here: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/asi/annualservicesinquiry2011/#.UgTpe2QmlF8 offers a fascinating read into the workings in the bizarrely-distorted world of MNCs-led exporting services in the country.

Here is one interesting set of facts, not shown by the CSO.


As chart above shows, in 2008-2011, Gross Value Added in ICT Services sector in Ireland (the sector heavily dominated by the likes of Google and other tax transfer-driven MNCs) has boomed, rising 30%. This growth, as the Government et al love reminding us, is allegedly translating into jobs, jobs and more jobs.

Alas, the facts speak for themselves:

  • Over 2008-2011 wages and salaries paid out in the sector rose just 8.2% or a tiny fraction of growth in value added.
  • GVA per person engaged in the sector rose 29.9% an
  • d GVA per full time employee rose 31.1% - both by far the fastest rates of growth of any sector in the economy.
  • The numbers engaged in the sector dropped (not rose) in 2008-2011 by 5.0% while numbers of full-time employees in the sector dropped 5.9%.
Can someone explain these miracles to me, please? By anything other than ongoing substitution of activity away from actual production of services toward more tax optimisation?.. Anyone?..

While at it, here is another illustrative chart to consider:


The above shows that Irish ICT Services workers constitute a truly miraculous breed of employees - so vastly more productive than any other type of human being in Ireland. Next time, walking down the Barrow Street, do marvel at all the geniuses walking about.
Any source

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

2/7/2013: Sunday Times June 23, 2013: G8 and Ireland


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from June 23, 2013


As G8 summits go, the latest one turned out to be as predictable as its predecessors – an event full of reaffirmations of well-known conflicts and pre-announced news. In terms of the former, the Lough Erne meeting delivered some fireworks on Syria. On the latter, there was a re-announcement of the previously widely publicized Free Trade pact between the US and Europe. Another pre-announced item involved the EU, UK and US push for corporate tax reforms.

The two economic themes of the Logh Erne Summit agenda are tied at the hip in the case of our small open economy heavily reliant on FDI attracted here by the opportunities for tax arbitrage. As such, the G8 meeting agreement poses a significant threat for Ireland's model of economic development. Although it will take five to ten years for the shock waves to be felt in Dublin, make no mistake, the winds of uncomfortable change are rising.


The trade agreement, first announced by the Taoiseach months before the G8 summit, promises to deliver some EUR120 billion in net benefits for the EU economy. Roughly 90% of these are expected to go to the Big 5 economies of the EU, leaving little for the smaller economies to compete over. Behind these net gains there are also some regional re-allocations of trade that will take place within the EU itself.

In the short term, Ireland is well-positioned to see an increase in exports by the US multinationals operating from here and to some domestic exporters. The uplift in trade flows between Europe and the US may even help attracting new, smaller and more opportunistic US firms' investments. While tens of billions in trade for Ireland, bandied around by various Irish ministers, are unlikely to materialize, a small boost will probably take place.

However, over time, the impact of the EU-US trade and investment liberalisation can lead to sizeable reductions in MNCs activity here. Under the free trade arrangements, longer-term investment and production decisions will be based on such factors as cost considerations, as well as concerns relating to access to the global markets, and taxes.


Consider these three drivers for future trade and economic activity in Ireland in the context of the G8 summit and other recent news.

On the cost competitiveness side, we have had some gains in terms of official metrics of labour productivity and unit labour costs. Major share of these gains came from destruction of less productive jobs in construction and domestic services. Increase in revenues transferred via Ireland by some services exporters since 2004-2007 period further contributed to improved competitiveness figures.

Once when we control for these temporary or tax-linked 'gains' Ireland is still a high cost destination for investors compared to the majority of our peers.  As reflected in Purchasing Managers Indices, since the beginning of the crisis, Irish producers of goods and services have faced rampant cost inflation when it comes to prices of inputs. Earnings and wages data for 2009-2012, released this week, show labour costs rising across the exports-oriented sectors. Lack of new capital, R&D and technological investments further underlines the fact that much of our productivity gains are related to jobs destruction and transfer pricing by the MNCs.

When the tariffs and other barriers to EU-US trade come down, some multinationals trading into Europe will have fewer incentives to locate their production in Ireland. This effect is likely to be felt stronger for those MNCs which trade increasingly outside the EU, focusing more on growth opportunities around the world. Based on experiences with other free trade areas, such as NAFTA and the EU, this can lead to increased on-shoring of FDI back into the US and into core European states, away from smaller economies that pre-trade liberalization acted as entrepots to Europe.


The tax dimension of the G8 agreement will be the most significant driver for change in years to come.

The G8 clearly outlined the reasons for urgency in dealing with the issues of both tax evasion (something that does not apply in Ireland's case) and tax avoidance (something that does have a direct impact on us). These are structural and will not dissipate even when the G8 economies recover.

All of the G8 economies are struggling with heavy public and private debt loads and/or high domestic taxation levels. All are stuck in a demographic, social security and pensions costs whirlpools pulling them into structural insolvency. In other words, not a single G8 nation can afford to lose corporate revenues to various tax havens.

In line with the longer-term nature of the drivers for tax reforms, G8-proposed agenda can also be seen in the context of quick, easier to implement changes and longer-term structural realignment of tax systems.

The first wave of tax reforms outlined in principle by the G8 Summit will focus on tightening some of the more egregious loopholes, usually involving officially recognised tax havens. On the European side, this will spell trouble for the likes of Gurnsey and Jersey. The first round will also target easy-to-spot idiosyncratic tax arrangements, such as the Double Irish scheme and similar structures in Holland. Shutting down Double Irish will impact around a quarter of our trade in services, or roughly EUR13-15 billion worth of exports – much more than the EU-US Free Trade Agreement promises to unlock. The cut can be quick, as much of this trade involves electronic transactions - easy to shift and costless to re-domicile.

Over time, as changes in tax systems bite deeper into the structure of European tax regimes, losses of exports and FDI are likely to mount. To raise substantive new tax revenues, the EU members of G8 will have to severely cut back tax advantages accorded to countries like Ireland by their competitive tax rates.

Free Trade zones are notorious for amplifying the role of comparative advantage in determining where companies choose to domicile. Thus, to achieve a level the playing field for trade-related investments within the EU, either the effective tax rates will have to be brought much closer to parity across the block, or the basis for taxation must be redistributed more evenly across producers and consumers of goods and services.

Forcing all EU countries to harmonise the rates of tax would be politically difficult. Instead, there is a ready-to-use solution to the problem of redistributing tax revenues available since 2009 - the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).

Under this mechanism companies selling goods and services from Ireland into European markets will report separate profits by each country of sales. These profits will then be reassigned back to the countries where each company has operations on the basis of a complex formula taking into the account company sales, employment levels and capital structure on the ground. The re-allocated profits will then be subject to a national tax rate. The end game from the CCCTB for Ireland will be effective end to the transfer pricing that goes along with the current system.

The EU Commission analysis claimed that with full cooperation, the enhanced CCCTB implementation will lead to an 8% rise in tax revenues across the EU. The main beneficiaries of these gains will be the Big 5 member states. The total net impact of CCCTB on all EU member states is expected to be nearly zero.

This suggests some sizeable reallocations of economic activity and tax revenues away from the smaller member states, like Ireland, in favour of the larger member states. January 2011, study by Ernst & Young for the Department of Finance concluded that Ireland can sustain one of the largest drops in tax revenues in the euro area due to CCCTB implementation. The estimates range up to 5.7% Government revenue decline, with our effective corporate tax rate rising to 23%, GDP falling by 1.6%-1.8%, and employment declining by 1.5%-1.6%.

The Ernst & Young report was compiled based using data for 2005. Since then, Irish economy's reliance on services exports grew from EUR 49.5 billion or under 31% of GDP to EUR90.7 billion or close to 56% of GDP. With services exports being a prime example of a tax-sensitive sector in the economy, we can safely assume that the above estimates of the adverse impact of CCCTB on Irish economy are conservative.

The CCCTB matches nearly perfectly the G8 Action plans relating to the issues of tax avoidance. It also fits the objectives of the OECD plan on addressing taxation base erosion and profit shifting which the OECD is preparing for the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20 in July.

While much of the impact of this week's G8 summit remains the matter for the future, there is no doubt that the G8 push toward curtailing aggressively competitive tax regimes is real.  In my view, Ireland has, approximately between five and ten years before our competitive advantage is severely eroded by the EU and the US efforts to coordinate the effective rates of taxation and consolidate reporting and payment bases for corporate profits. We must use these years wisely to build up our technological capabilities and develop a skills-based high-value added and highly competitive economy.



Box-out:

The latest data on the duration of working life (a measure of the number of years a person aged 15 is expected to be active in the labour market over their lifetime) shows that in 2000-2002, on average, European workers spent 32.9 years in employment or searching for jobs. This number rose to 34.7 years by 2011. In Ireland, the same increase in duration of working life took Irish workers from spending on average 33.3 years in labour market activities in 2000-2002 to 34.0 years in 2011. The increase in years worked in the case of Ireland was the third lowest in the euro area. In 2011, duration of working life ranged between 39.1 and 44.4 years in the Nordic countries and Switzerland – countries with much more sustainable pensions costs paths than Ireland. The significance of this is that given our pensions, housing and investment crises, Irish workers can look forward to spending some four-to-five years more working to fund their future retirement. Aside from a dramatic greying of our working population this means that even after the economic recovery takes hold, there might be no jobs for today's younger unemployed, as the older generations hold onto their careers for longer.

Any source

Friday, June 28, 2013

28/6/2013: Exports-led recovery: Q1 2013

I covered the headline numbers and trends for the GDP and GNP in previous two posts: here and here. Now, onto some more detailed analysis.

Remember, from the very beginning of the crisis, Irish and Troika leaders have been incessantly talking about the 'exports-led recovery'. Position on this blog concerning this thesis consistently remained that:

  1. Exports growth is great, but
  2. Exports growth is unlikely to be sufficient to lift the entire economy, and
  3. Exports growth projections were unrealistic, while
  4. Exports re-orientation toward services, away from goods was less conducive to delivering real growth in the economy.
Q1 2013 data continues to confirm my analysis.

In Q1 2013, based on real valuations (expressed in constant market prices),
  • Exports of Goods & Services shrunk 6.47% q/q and fell 4.09% y/y. This compares to +1.19% q/q growth in Q4 2012 and +1.28% expansion y/y. Compared to Q1 2011, when the current coalition took over the reigns in the Leinster House, total exports of goods and services are down 0.88% in real, inflation-adjusted terms. Troika sustainability projections envisioned growth of over 6% over the same period of time.
  • Imports of Goods and Services showed pretty much the same dynamics as exports in both Q4 2012 and Q1 2013, but owing to sharper contractions in 2011-2012 these are now down 4.34% compared to Q1 2011.
  • Exports of Goods fell in Q1 2013 by 3.83% q/q and 9.37% y/y, while there were declines of 2.68% q/q and 2.33% y/y in Q4 2012.
  • Exports of Services were down 8.75% q/q but up 1.27% y/y in Q1 2013, and these were up 4.77% q/q and 4.63% y/y in Q4 2012.


  • Trade Balance in Goods and Services fell 4.96% q/q and was down 3.63% y/y in Q1 2013, with Q4 2012 respective changes at -15.91% q/q and +0.98% y/y. Compared to Q1 2011, trade balance is up 15.91%
  • Trade Balance in Goods was down 6.63% q/q in Q4 2012 and this deteriorated to -10.73% growth in Q1 2013. Y/y, trade balance in goods contracted 0.05% in Q4 2012 and shrunk 10.59% in Q1 2013. On Q1 2011, trade balance in goods is down 14.04%.
  • Trade Balance in Services fell from EUR1,130mln in Q3 2012 to EUR132mln in Q4 2012 before improving to EUR601mln in Q1 2013. In Q1 2012 the balance stood at EUR28 million.


Any source